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This is a study of the impact of the United States drug-related de-certification upon the 
consolidation of democracy in Colombia. De-certification is one of the most powerful tools 
the United States has to focus international attention on the threat of narcotics and drug 
trafficking. This thesis argues that the de-certification decision made by the United States on 
March 1, 1996, in the short term undermines Colombian democracy. The de-certification is 
politically oriented to oust the government of President Emesto Samper Pizano. President 
Pizano was targeted because of the infiltration of illegal drug money in his presidential 
campaign. The de-certification did not accomplish its objective. On the contrary, it brought 
more instability to the country, made the social situation more volatile and the democracy 
weaker and more vulnerable. However, it is possible that in the long term de-certification 
could have a positive impact on Colombian democracy, by helping the state to develop a 
strong posture against corruption and the drug syndicates. 
v 
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This thesis analyzes the impact of the 1996 U.S. de-certification of Colombia on the 
consolidation of Colombian democracy. The objective of the study is to answer three 
important questions: Is democracy consolidated in Colombia? Is the United States, with its 
policies on narco-trafficking, including political and economic sanctions, undermining 
Colombian democracy? Can the war against narco-trafficking be won by a democracy, or 
more easily won by a military regime? 
The certification is one of the most powerful tools the U.S. has to focus international 
attention on the narcotics threat and achieve results. This process of certification has two 
different stages. First, the Foreign Assistance Act requires the U.S. President to identify a list 
of the major drug-producing and transit countries as defined in the law. Second, within this 
list the U.S. administration will determine which countries are fully cooperating with the 
United States in the Drug War. If a country is considered to be less than fully cooperative 
with the administration, this country will be de-certified. De-certification places that nation 
on a "black list" that is sent annually to the U.S. Congress. Being on this list negatively 
affects the economic aid and trade preferences given by the U.S. government to that nation. 
The incident that triggered the change of U.S. policy toward Colombia is known 
throughout the world as the "narco-scandal." This investigation in Colombia is known as the 
"8,000 process," and involves the payment of more than$ 6 million from the Cali Cartel to 
the 1994 presidential campaign of President Emesto Samper Pizano and various Liberal party 
members in Congress. This incident has led the Clinton administration to the de-certification 
of Colombia. However, the United States, while trying to achieve its political objectives 
through the de-certification process, which seeks to remove Emesto Samper from the 
Presidency, did not consider sufficiently the negative impact that this decision would have 
on the consolidation of Colombian democracy. This impact may result in the weakening of 
the Colombian democracy. Furthermore, de-certification has been considered by the 
Colombian people as an act of aggression, and created a very strong and unprecedented 
backlash in Colombia. These factors could seriously undermine progress of the 30-year U.S. 
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effort to promote democracy and American values throughout the world, particularly among 
its neighbors in Latin America. For this reason democratization theory is the best tool to 
analyze the impact of U.S. de-certification on Colombia's democracy. 
This thesis argues that to understand how Colombia arrived at de-certification, it is 
necessary to consider some important historical facts. The argument is that de-certification 
is not the result of whim. On the contrary, this political and economic sanction is the product 
of an historical process. Unfortunately, this historical process is the sad history of drugs in 
Colombia. The author briefly analyzes the background of the Colombian Mafia beginning 
with its first links to the marijuana business, followed by the cocaine trade. This explains 
how these two illegal businesses have led Colombia into a major and violent political 
conflict. The drug business has brought the country to a situation in which the relations 
between the Mafia and guerrillas, the Mafia and political parties, as well as rampant 
corruption are important parts of the Colombian political equation. 
With this historical background, the author explains why Colombian democracy is in 
danger today. This thesis argues that although the U.S. de-certification is not responsible for 
all of Colombia's problems, this external pressure mixed with guerrilla strength, narco-
trafficking, corruption, and civil disorder produces a powerful time bomb. These problems 
are present in all societies at some time, but it is unusual for them to be present at the same 
time and on the side as they are now in Colombia. This internal violence and permanent 
turmoil, plus the difficulties of the international environment represented by political, moral, 
and economic sanctions, or the silence of allies, are leading up to the final test for the 
survivability of Colombia democracy. The worst aspect of this scenario is that normally the 
only groups or sectors that may benefit from this outcome are those groups outside of law 
and order. 
From the result of this analysis, it is clear that the war against narco-trafficking cannot 
be won either by a democracy or by a military regime. While narco-trafficking is not dealt 
with on the international level with an understanding that this problem is a two-sided 
problem of production and consumption, the war against narco-trafficking cannot be won, 
regardless of type of political regime. However, it is important to point out that for 
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Colombia, winning is a matter of survival and the individual goal of the state must be the end 
the drug cultivation, drug production and drug trafficking. The war against drugs should be 
Colombia's center of gravity and the primary focus of the national interest, national strategy, 
defense budget, and military and police operations. If Colombia follows this path, democracy 
will be stronger, the narco-guerrillas will lose their financial support and narco-trafficking 
will end at least in Colombia. In the author's opinion Colombia must pursue these goals with 
or without U.S. support. 
After an explanation of the Colombian side of the problem, this thesis examines the 
implications ofU.S. policies. The final objective of the drug war for the United States is to 
win the war against narco-trafficking. Even so, the strategies to achieve this end often are 
not clear, and are affected by the continuous changes in the administration's approaches. 
Sometimes U.S. policies do not take into consideration that this war is not a conventional one 
and is not fought in one place; even worse, the enemy sometimes is not clearly defined. This 
war is a low intensity type of conflict, a characteristic that makes the probabilities of full 
success more difficult to achieve. However, to end drug production, drug trafficking, and 
drug consumption, the United States has to use all the political, diplomatic, economic, 
military and law enforcement means available. 
The danger of"unintended consequences" is always present given the power of the U.S. 
government. The probability is that all the bureaucracies involved in the drug war and the 
process of de-certification will not evaluate carefully the impact that this type of political, 
economic and moral sanction may have on Colombian democracy. Unfortunately, de-
certification has a major impact, especially on those institutions that are working in support 
of the drug war, and on the thousands of honest business people who are willing to 
demonstrate that there are other ways to make a profit the trafficking. 
After considering both sides of the problem, this thesis uses Robert Dahl's 
democratization theory. According to Dahl, the chance that a country will be governed at the 
national level by a regime in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the 
population, depends on at least seven sets of complex conditions. This study will use these 
seven characteristics of democracy to test whether the Colombian pattern of democracy 
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before and after the de-certification has changed. The combination of domestic variables 
includes the following: historical sequences, the degree of concentration in the 
socioeconomic order, the level of socioeconomic development, inequalities, subcultural 
cleavages, and the beliefs of political activists. Dahl concludes by saying that all of these 
variables are open to the influence of foreign actors. 
As a tool to arrive at the final conclusions, the author analyzes the three hypotheses with 
the goal of identifying the most credible of the following three competing hypotheses: The 
U.S. de-certification has "undermined" democracy in Colombia; the U.S. de-certification 
has "strengthened" democracy in Colombia; the U.S. de-certification has not 
"impacted"Colombian democracy at all. 
The author's most important conclusion is that the de-certification in the short term 
undermines Colombian democracy, but in the long term it is possible that it will strengthen 
Colombian democracy. This permanent pressure of the United States on Colombia has 
helped to augment political fires within the country, but never to suppress them. If guerrillas, 
narco-trafficking and corruption were the obstacles to democratic consolidation in the past, 
today U.S. intervention is one of the crucial factors for internal instability. Because of this, 
Colombian democracy is suffering its greatest crisis in recent history. However, if the 
Government of Colombia in the future adopts a strong posture against narco-trafficking by 
establishing the extradition and other important laws against drug-trafficking, democracy will 




This thesis analyzes the impact ofthe 1996 U.S. de-certification of Colombia on the 
consolidation of the Colombian democracy. I will try to answer the following questions: 
• Is democracy consolidated in Colombia? 
• Is the United States, with its policies on narco-trafficking that include political and 
economic sanctions, undermining Colombian democracy? 
• Can the war against narco-trafficking be won by a democracy, or, can it be more 
easily won by a military regime? 
B. BACKGROUND 
On Thursday, February 29, 1996, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that 
the State Department was advising the White House to "de-certify" Colombia's efforts in 
cooperation with the United States in the Drug War. This announcement by Secretary 
Christopher sought to give a warning of the Clinton Administration's final decision, which 
was made public on the afternoon of Friday, March 1, 1996. The purpose of the de-
certification was to focus international attention on the narcotic's threat and achieve results. 
The Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year the President identify the major drug-
producing and drug-transit countries and determines whether they have fully cooperated with 
the United States or taken adequate steps on their own narcotics control. 
This process of certification has two different stages. First, the Foreign Assistance Act 
requires the President of the United States to identify a list of the major drug-producing and 
transit countries as defined in the law. 1 Second, within this list the U.S. administration will 
determine which countries are fully cooperating wit~ the United States in the Drug War. If 
a country is considered to be less than fully cooperative with the administration, this country 
1 The inclusion on the list does not reflect anti-drug performance. It is simply a 
recognition that large amounts of illicit drugs are produced in or transit through that 
country. 
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will be de-certified. De-certification places that nation on a "black list" that is sent annually 
to the U.S. Congress. Being on this list affects negatively the economic aid and trade 
preferences given by the U.S. government to that nation. 
Since this process started in 1984, the number of countries covered under this mechanism 
has increased. In 1986, 16 countries were evaluated on their cooperation with Washington, 
ten years later the same process numbered 31 countries. During the 1980s only two of the 
countries evaluated on anti-drug performance were de-certified, Iran and Syria. During the 
1990s, Burma was added to the list because of its lack of cooperation. In 1995, the list of de-
certified countries was composed of Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Nigeria and Syria. For the 
first time, Colombia was added to this list In 1996.2 
Since the beginning of this certification review process in 1986, Colombia is the only 
democracy to be de-certified. Colombia, a country that throughout the 20th century has 
shown itself to be an ally of the United States, is now being punished by the United States 
for not cooperating in the drug war. Colombia is the same country that fought to destroy the 
Medellin Cartel. The same country that in 1995 captured and imprisoned the leaders of the 
Cali Cartel, the most powerful drug mafia in the world. This same country that lost thousands 
of innocent and honest people in this war is now classified as a world pariah with countries 
like Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria. 
After the decision of the U.S. Administration to de-certify Colombia, the psychological 
impact in Colombia was immeasurable. The Colombian Government was stunned and 
Colombia's Congress protested. A communist Congressmen even tried to burn the U.S. flag 
in the main senatorial room of the Congress. The industrial and commercial sectors were 
afraid of the economic impact of this decision. Even people who live out their lives without 
paying much attention to international events organized to protest an action that they 
considered an act of aggression by the United States Nationalist feeling that had not been 
seen for many years arose in Colombia. 
2 Juan Tokatlian, "Hacia una Nueva De-certificacion de Colombia," El Tiempo, Via 
Internet, Bogota, September 15, 1996, p.1. 
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From this kind of reaction in Colombia, almost anyone can see how powerful the United 
States is. With one decision, the U.S. administration has completely changed the general 
attitude in Colombia, igniting anti-American and nationalistic feelings among a wide range 
of Colombian citizens. Furthermore, this decision that was so important to Colombia, 
received virtually no coverage in U.S. television and print media. 
However, a country like the United States does not make decisions without some 
strategic or political objective. Despite all Colombian government's claims of honesty, 
corruption related to the drug trade touches all levels of Colombian society. This cancer has 
led some analysts and journalists to call Colombia a "narco-democracy," or "narcocracy."3 
Colombia has been at least a nominal democracy since 1958. But after 40 years the nature 
of that democracy still in question. 
The event that triggered the change of U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia is known 
throughout the world as the "narco-scandal." This is the investigation that in Colombia is 
known as the "8,000 process," and involves the payment of more than $ 6 million from the 
Cali Cartel to the 1994 presidential campaign of President Emesto Samper Pizano and 
various Liberal party members in Congress. This investigation proved what has been known 
in Colombia for decades: the narco-traffickers, in return for support from Colombian 
politicians, have obtained benefits, such as the end of the extradition.4 This double standard 
of the Colombian government and Colombian society is now publicly exposed. This led the 
Clinton administration to de-certification. 
A scenario where the drug lords obtain sufficient sway over institutions to, in effect, 
run the government. Cited in Kevin Jack Riley, The Implications of Colombian Drug 
Industry and Death Squad Political Violence for US. Counter Narcotics Policy, 
RAND National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, California, 1993, p. 42. 
4 The Extradition treaty was signed between the governments of United States and 
Colombia in September 14, 1979. The treaty became a U.S. law in March 4, 1982. The 
treaty was considered one ofthe most important tools of law enforcement before it was 
found unconstitutional by the Colombian Supreme Court on December 12, 1986. 
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C. THEORY 
Before examining applicable theory it is important to describe the nature of the U.S.-
Colombia relationship. According to a study conducted at the most prestigious university of 
Colombia, The Andes, entitled "Narcotrafico en Colombia," for the last two decades the 
Colombian relationship with the United States has been marked by total "dependency," 
especially in the field of narco-trafficking.5 This relationship is framed by a vicious cycle, 
where the United States is the largest consumer of cocaine in the world, and at the same time 
Colombia is the biggest producer of cocaine in the world. If the traffic of narcotics occurred 
only within Colombian borders, this phenomena would be described as a problem of public 
health and would not have dramatic international dimensions. Because of this the nature of 
this relationship is not that of two allies that are united to fight a common enemy. On the 
contrary, it is a relationship where the strongest country establishes what the weakest country 
must achieve in order to win the stronger country's war. 
In his classic work on the subject of democracy Robert Dahl specifies three ways by 
which the actions, reactions, or expected actions of external actors can influence democracy 
in a particular country. The first way is through "manipulating any combination of variables." 
The second way is through "the actions of foreigners who may alter the options available to 
a regime without necessarily altering the form of regime." The third way is through "outright 
foreign domination."6 Examples of the second type of external influence by the United 
States include, denying visas to Colombian nationals, restricting U.S. citizens from traveling 
to Colombia, declaring cities like Medellin and Cali as places of extreme danger seriously 
impacting tourism into the country, restricting flights of Colombian airlines into the U.S., 
and more, this kind of influence have affected foreign investment in Colombia. Dahl's third 
5 Carlos Gustavo Arrieta, Narcotrafico en Colombia, Bogota: Tercer Mundo Editores, 
1993, pp. 18-19. 
6 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971, pp. 189-191. 
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type of option have been used successfully by the U.S. to initiate democracy in Grenada, 
Panama and Haiti. 
The author's argument is that today, the relationship between the United States and 
Colombia is not framed by the second and third type of external influence. Rather, the first 
type of action "manipulation of variables," is the best way to understand the impact of U.S. 
decisions on Colombian democracy. To understand this third type of external influence, Dahl 
offered the most generally accepted listing oflocal conditions that significantly increase the 
chances of public contestation and democracy (or as he terms it, "Polyarchy").7 The 
combination of domestic variables include the following: (1) historical sequences, (2) the 
degree of concentration in the socioeconomic order, (3) the level of socioeconomic 
development, (4) inequalities, (5) subcultural cleavages, and (6) the beliefs of political 
activists. He concludes by saying that all of these variables are open to (7) the influence of 
foreign actors. 
Other authors in the field of international relations, such K.J Holsti, offer similar 
characterizations: 
In an age where societies are closely connected through transnational associations 
and networks of dependency, many purposes can only be achieved or defended 
by manipulating, sustaining, or altering conditions in other countries. 8 
I will apply Dahl's seven conditions to Colombia, before and after the de-certification, with 
the goal of identifying the most credible of the following three competing hypotheses: 
• The U.S. de-certification has "undermined" democracy in Colombia; 
• the U.S. de-certification has "strengthened" democracy in Colombia; 
• the U.S. de-certification has not "impacted"Colombian democracy at all. 
7 Dahl, p.32. 
8 K.J. Holsti, International Politics, A Framework for Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1992, p.ll6. 
5 
The careful testing of these hypotheses will permit the author to arrive at his conclusions 
about the impact of the U.S. de-certification on Colombian democracy. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND IMPORTANCE 
This thesis is a single case study of U.S.-Colombian relations, based on the author's 
research. Given that the de-certification of Colombia is a very recent and unprecedented 
event, there is virtually no literature on the topic. This thesis seeks to fill that gap in the 
literature. I have carefully monitoring news in Colombia and the United States press, and 
took a research trip to Washington D.C. and New York in October 1996, where I held 
meetings on the topic at the Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security 
Council and the United Nations Organization. 
The implications of this thesis do not simply concern drug trafficking, or the relationship 
between a superpower and a developing nation, or drug diplomacy. This topic is important 
for two other reasons: 
• The spread of international narcotics trafficking constitutes one of the most 
persistent serious challenges to U.S. foreign and domestic interests in the post-
cold war era. As Secretary Warren Christopher said in his January 1995 address 
at Harvard University: 
The need to attack international narcotics trafficking and organized crime is one 
of the five key objectives of our foreign policy.9 
• The war against narcotics, including the violence and self destruction, is driving 
the Republic of Colombia to a point of "no return," a point where the survival of 
democracy is in danger. 
9 Robert Gelbard, "International Narcotics Control Effort in the Western Hemisphere," 
Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House of 
International Relations Committee, Washington D.C. March 29, 1995. Cited on U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch, Volume 6, Number 16, Bureau ofPublic Affairs, April 
17, 1995, p.337. 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
In the Second Chapter, the author suggests that the de-certification is not the result of a 
one- year process or the result of a misunderstanding between U.S. and Colombian officials 
or even worse the result of a bureaucratic competition between U.S. agencies for recognition 
and budget resources. Instead, the author argue that de-certification is the result of an 
historical process, a process of more than two decades of narcotics trafficking in Colombia. 
During this process the state and the society were not able to act promptly or with the 
necessary courage and values to destroy this threat from the beginning. This permissiveness 
gradually brought the country to the point where corruption has reached all levels of society 
and where the process of democratic consolidation has been seriously undermined by this 
scourge. Furthermore, this process has brought the country to a point at which even the 
institution of the presidency has been seriously threatened. 
The Third Chapter describes the U.S. process of certification step by step. First, there is 
a brief description of certification that is complemented with the certification procedures 
established by U.S. law. Second, there is an explanation of the various types of 
certifications, this part is complemented by an explanation of the vital national interest 
certification received by Colombia on March 1995 because of its 1994-1995 counter-drug 
effort. Third, this part describes briefly the 1996 process, which countries were evaluated and 
its results, in this part an explanation of why Colombia was de-certify is provided. Finally, 
there is an analysis of the automatic and discretionary sanctions, and the implications of de-
certification. 
The Fourth Chapter deals with the impact of de-certification on Colombian democracy. 
In this chapter the author explores the democratic path of the country over the last 50 years. 
This background is very important because it represents a clear explanation of Colombian 
democratic culture. Through good and bad times, this culture has permitted the country to 
survive through the most difficult situations. In this part, a brief analysis of the 1953-1957 
military regime is provided as well as an analysis of the National Front experience (1958-
197 4 ), which was the transition period from military to democratic rule. The second half of 
this chapter explores why the democratic consolidation of Colombia is in danger. By using 
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democratization theory the author is able to assess whether Colombia is a consolidating 
democracy. This section explains the different problems that Colombia as a democracy 
faces, problems such narco-trafficking, communist guerrillas and corruption, that according 
to the author seriously threatens the existence of democracy. Given the U.S. de-certification 
as well as the ongoing U.S. intervention in internal matters of Colombia, democracy is more 
volatile. This will bring the author to conclude that in this period it is possible for Colombia 
to start a third reverse wave of democratization; an outcome that will destroy the democratic 
path that was described previously. Finally there is a very important question in the field of 
civil- military relations that the author raises: Would a democratic or a military regime be 
better equipped to solve the drug problem? On the bases of democratization theory, the 
author concludes that a democratic regime will have a better chance of success in the drug 
war, especially taking into consideration the very serious internal difficulties Colombia has. 
The Fifth Chapter, is dedicated to the implications of U.S. policies for Colombian 
democracy. The chapter explains the different political, diplomatic, military and economic 
means the United States has to implement its policies. It argues that despite such a variety 
of means, U.S. actions can lead to unintended consequences. Second, the author uses Dahl's 
approach, and analyzes the seven conditions favoring democracy before and after the de-
certification decision was made. The purpose is to conclude whether this U.S. action will 
produce a positive outcome, the strengthening of Colombian democracy, or a negative 
outcome, the weakening of democracy. After analyzing these characteristics in a chart, the 
author examines four of the factors. Finally, and as a tool to arrive at the final conclusions, 
the author analyzes the three hypotheses that were mention in the methodology of this study. 
The testing of the three hypotheses permits the author to arrive at a very interesting 
conclusion: That the de-certification in the short term undermines Colombian democracy, 
but that in the long term it is possible that it will strengthen Colombian democracy. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Research of the drug-related de-certification and its impact on Colombia's democracy 
have been difficult for the author. On one hand, there are no studies about this topic, this 
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especially because it is the first time that Colombia received this kind of sanction. On the 
other hand, as time passes, experts in the subjects are just beginning to study and write about 
the impact of de-certification over different areas such as the economy, the social conflict, 
and the drug war. Despite the lack of literature on the topic, it is motivating for the author 
to realize that in a recent conference held in Bogota about the de-certification, one of the 
panelist presented a paper with the same title as this thesis. This shows. that my perception 
about the impact of this sanction upon Colombia's democracy is not far from those experts 
in drug-related matters opinions. It also shows, that this fascinating topic marked by daily 
events, is just starting to provide the necessary arguments social scientist need to develop 
their theories. Future studies on the topic will provide a better understanding of a situation 
that today is perceived as a dead end. 
9 
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II. COLOMBIAN PATH TOWARDS DE-CERTIFICATION 
A. WHY COLOMBIA WAS DE-CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES 
It is almost impossible to understand why Colombia arrived at de-certification, without 
first taking into consideration some important historical facts in the· recent past of the 
country. The argument of this chapter is that de-certification is not the result of whim, on 
the contrary, this political and economic sanction is the product of an historical process. 
Unfortunately, this historical process is the sad history of drugs in Colombia. A methodology 
to answer the question of why Colombia was de-certified by the United States, is almost like 
describing a very dangerous illness, from its beginnings and its root cause to its final stage. 
To achieve this, I will briefly analyze the background of the Colombian Mafia beginning 
with its first links to the marijuana business, followed by the cocaine trade. This will explain 
how these two illegal businesses have led Colombia into a major and violent political 
conflict. The drug business has brought the country to a situation in which the relations 
between the Mafia and guerrillas, and the Mafia and political parties, is an important part 
of Colombia's political equation. This will be referred to in this thesis as "the marriage 
between the Mafia and the political parties." 
But not everything is happiness for Colombia's political parties and the Mafia, and of 
course, not all marriages work. The political elites understand that a full social and political 
assimilation of the narco-traffickers is impossible. On the other side, the narco-traffickers 
realize that honest people of Colombia feel repugnance for them and their business. In recent 
Colombian history there was a period of "divorce" between the cocaine Mafia and 
Colombian society. This period was one of the most painful and bloodiest in Colombia's 
history, and is also known as the "narco-terrorism period," (1989-1990). This period was 
marked by the narco-traffickers' response to the extradition treaty, which allowed Colombia 
to send members of the cartels to be prosecuted and incarcerated in the U.S. In this period, 
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violence was the result of the new Medellin Cartel's motto that described clearly their 
ideology "we would rather have a grave in Colombia, than a jail in the United States."10 
Even though Colombia was suffering killings and bombings all over its territory, the 
underground corruption continued to be a tool to survive or to make money in Colombian 
society. Everything and everyone had a price. The politicians especially understood this, and 
developed all kinds oflegal and illegal conditions to assimilate the narco~traffickers and their 
money into Colombian society. This led people like former U.S. drug czar William Bennett 
to say "I warned that Colombia was degenerating into a narco-democracy." 11 For years 
Colombia tolerated drug-traffickers as the traffickers quietly spread their influence through 
Congress, the courts, and the police. 
This long process of more than two decades of violence, corruption, narco-trafficking and 
the struggle for power started to end on August 7, 1994, when President Ernesto Sam per 
assumed the presidency of Colombia. Shortly after his inauguration Samper was the first 
Colombian president legally entangled and investigated for the infiltration of narcotics-
related funds into his presidential campaign. In this case, funds of more than $6 million were 
in question. 
According to El Tiempo, the most influential Colombian newspaper: "Sam per was paying 
for every one's broken plates."12 The process known internationally as the "narco-scandal" 
and nationally as the "8,000 process," 13 produced a change in the easygoing attitude of 
Colombians towards traffickers. At the same time the "8,000 process" proved to be crucial 
10 Mylene Sauloy and Yves Le Bonniec,"El patriotismo de los emergentes," A quien 
beneficia la Cocaina? Bogota: TM. Editores, September 1994, p.54. 
11 Jesse Helms, "The Challenge to Colombia,"Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1996. Cited 
in Information Services on Latin America, vol. 51, no. 3, March 1996, p.208. 
12 Mary Beth Sheridan, "Samper Scandal a Symbol of Colombia's Drug History," Miami 
Herald, November 5, 1995, in Information Services on Latin America, vol. 50, no. 11, 
November 1995, p.165. 
13 The investigation of drug-related money on Samper's presidential campaign is called 
this way, simply because 8,000 was the internal number assigned to this investigation 
by the General Prosecutor Office. 
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in its effect on U.S. interests, which had been frustrated by the traffickers' ability to 
influence laws and win official favors in Colombia. The U.S. de-certification of Colombia 
was the first major international sanction that resulted from an historical process, a process 
in which Colombia was not able to confront with all the state power the scourge of the drug 
cartels, the same scourge that later would threaten Colombia's own survival as a nation. 
B. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROCESS 
1. The Colombian Cocaine Mafia 
In the 1980s, Colombia achieved international notoriety as a major narcotic trafficking 
center. Nonetheless, the country's involvement with drugs is rooted farther back in history. 
As in Bolivia and Peru, although on a smaller scale, Colombia's indigenous populations had 
grown and chewed coca for a thousand years. Marijuana cultivation, in contrast, is a much 
more recent phenomenon. Marijuana arrived in Colombia along the Caribbean coast via 
Panama during the first decade of the twentieth century. By the 1930s, limited cultivation of 
marijuana had begun among the black population of the north Atlantic coast of Colombia. 
During World War II, experiments with hemp cultivation, designed to increase fiber 
production for the war effort, substantially expanded its cultivation. 14 
The real jump in Colombian marijuana production began in the early 1960s, as a result 
of the growing demand generated by the market in the United States. By the early 1970s, 
Colombia was the major supplier of marijuana, although most of the U.S. markets remained 
in the hands of Mexican and Jamaican traffickers. Between 5,000 and 30,000 small farmers 
from Colombia's Caribbean coast came to depend directly on marijuana crops for their 
livelihood. 
The collapse of the Colombian marijuana trade might have been the end of the story, 
were it not for the emergence of a number of factors that contributed to the development of 
the cocaine market. In the early 1970s, the demand for cocaine began to expand rapidly in 
the United States, primarily because federal counter narcotics policies were making other 
14 Colombia: A Country Study, Washington D.C.: Federal Research Division, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1990, p.128. 
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drugs, such as LSD, harder to find. In prior decades, cocaine had been an exotic drug 
available only to the wealthy elites. During the mid and late 1970s, both cocaine and 
marijuana, along with coffee and sugar, probably sustained the agricultural economy during 
what was otherwise a very difficult and stressful time in Colombia. 15 
While the demand for cocaine was undergoing rapid change, so was the supply. Cocaine 
provides huge amounts of revenue relative to its weight. The early participants in cocaine 
production recognized and exploited this fact by developing the necessary production and 
export capacity. The limited raw coca supplies produced in Colombia were combined with 
coca paste imported from Bolivia and Peru, refined in "kitchen laboratories" and smuggled 
into the United States. By late 1977, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) had 
opened a file under the name of"Medellin Trafficking Syndicate." Violence was an integral 
part of the operations of the Medellin syndicate from its inception. As the organization grew 
in size, power, and wealth, it also became ruthless in consolidating its dominance in Latin 
America. The Medellin bosses in 1978 and 1979 turned their attention to controlling 
wholesale distribution in the U.S. This began a period of violence in southern Florida known 
as the "Cocaine War."16 
By the early 1980s, marijuana trafficking was already being eclipsed by the cocaine trade 
in terms of the wealth and power associated with it. Cocaine also generated criminal 
organizations that were more profitable, more vertically integrated, more hierarchical in 
structure, and more ruthless in their systematic use ofbribery, intimidation, and assassination 
than the marijuana traffickers. In 1985 the level of violence in Colombia increased due to 
the rise of the cocaine industry, which provoked a qualitative change in violence. Relying on 
paid assassins, locally known as "Sicarios," Colombia's drug lords fought not only among 
themselves, but also launched a systematic campaign of murder and intimidation against 
government authorities who would not be bribed. This enabled an effective circumvention 
15 Bruce Bagley, Coca and Cocaine, Cultural Survival and LASP, p.89. 
16 Colombia: A Country Study, p.129. 
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of the country's justice system, and the process drove scores of Colombians from all walks 
of life into a self-imposed exile. 17 
In the mid-1980s, Colombian cocaine traffickers probably earned a minimum of $5 
billion to $6 billion yearly from sales in international markets. The Colombian Mafias were 
the most important actors in the cocaine trade. By their own estimates, the larger Colombian 
organizations account for 70-80 percent of the cocaine exported from Colombia. Because 
they handled some Peruvian and Bolivian exports, these organizations probably controlled 
60-70 percent of the world trade in cocaine. The profits of these organizations cannot be 
estimated with any certainty, in part because the prices ofkey inputs are unknown. Chemicals 
and raw materials fluctuate considerably. However, experts in Colombia and the United 
States believe that the rate of profit ranges from 50 percent to 80 percent. Few if any products 
are as profitable as cocaine. 18 
Most of the billions of dollars earned by cocaine traffickers stay abroad in offshore 
havens such the Cayman Islands, Panama or in investments in foreign real estate, securities, 
and businesses. However, the Colombian government had maintained an unofficial policy 
of welcoming the traffickers' money. By the mid-1980s, the Colombian government's 
general posture toward the illicit drug industry had hardened considerably. After the 
assassination of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in April 1984, President Belisario 
Betancourt declared drugs "the most serious problem that Colombia has had in its history" 
and called for a "great national mobilization" against traffickers. 19 
The Colombian cocaine Mafias falls into the category of what Professor Mark Moore 
calls "large, durable criminal organizations."20 Law enforcement officials believe that 
17 Rensselaer W. Lee III, The White Labyrinth, Cocaine and Political Power, New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1990, p.130. 
18 Lee, pp.35-50. 
19 Belisario Betancourt, President's Address to the Nation, Bogota, National Radio, May 
1, 1984. 
20 Mark Moore, "In America's Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized 
Crime," Drug Policy and Organized Crime, Washington D.C.: np., 1986, p.23. 
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Colombian syndicates are vertically integrated "from clandestine laboratories in Colombia 
to the state side distribution." However, these organizations seem to be more amorphous than 
criminal organizations in the U.S. or Western Europe. Their boundaries are fluid, the cast of 
characters changes continually, and the links in the chain are bound together in an intricate 
system of contracts and subcontracts.21 
2. Cocaine Traffickers and Guerrillas 
The connection between the cocaine industry and Marxist guerrilla groups in Colombia 
represents a continuing source of much speculation and controversy (in Washington.) 
Insurgents and drug dealers sometimes share the same territories, thriving in areas without 
strong central government control and without a naturally integrated economic structure. 
On one side, in the U.S. point of view there are in fact points of contact between the 
cocaine industry and guerrilla organizations. However, evidence does not suggest the 
existence of a narco-guerrilla alliance.22 Drug dealers, especially the larger operators, hold 
some anti-establishment views; they are strongly anti-U.S., and they favor a more egalitarian 
social structure. However, as landowners, ranchers, and owners of industrial property 
(including cocaine laboratories), dealers are far more closely aligned with the traditional 
power structure in Colombia than with the revolutionary left.23 
On the other side, in the Colombian point of view, the link between subversive groups 
and drug traffic was factually evident for a long time. The first document produced by the 
Communist Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Comunistas) 
known by the Spanish acronym ofF ARC, which mention this subject openly came into a 
light in 1982. This document was elaborated during the Seventh National Guerrilla 
Conference and it contains the guiding principles assumed by the guerrillas squads 
( cuadrillas) regarding drug trafficking issue; in this document the cuadrillas are ordered to 
"preserve the balance between the production of cocaine and the family consumption 
21 Lee, p.99. 
22 Ibid, pp.12-17. 
23 Ibid, pp.158-159. 
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(economia familiar) crops" and carry out a special indoctrination work among cocaine-leaf 
raisers to have them on the side of the revolution.24 
The narco-guerrilla relationship is complex and sometimes mysterious; because of the 
guerrilla flexibility and narco-traffickers audacity it has been difficult in the past to find clear 
evidence on which to base an interpretation. The evidence that can be compiled through this 
research suggests the following considerations: First, most narcoticS- traffickers are not 
revolutionaries. They seek to buy into and to manipulate the political system, but not to 
change the system in any fundamental way. A 1984 manifesto of 100 Colombian Mafia 
leaders declared: 
' 
We have no connection with, nor do-we accept any such connection with armed 
guerrillas. Our activities have never been designed to replace the democratic and 
republican form of government.25 
Second, the relationship between traffickers and the revolutionary left is probably more 
hostile than cooperative. The more mature and better funded the trafficking organization, the 
less likely it is to collaborate with guerrillas. Narco-guerrilla conflicts tend to revolve around 
issues such as territorial control, relations with the coca-growing peasantry, and the 
distributions of the economic benefits of the drug trade. In Colombia, guerrillas have 
attacked traffickers' laboratories, ranches, and farms, and have kidnaped members of their 
families. Traffickers have retaliated in a variety of ways: by organizing rural self-defense 
groups, by massacring peasant villagers who appear to support guerrillas, and by 
exterminating visible members ofthe extreme left in the cities.26 
24 
"Information About Drug Trafficking," Colombian Army Intelligence Document, 
Comado del Ejercito Nacional, Bogota, June 1996, p.6. 
25 
"Text of Drug Traffickers, Terms of Ending Activities," El Tiempo, Via Internet, 
Bogota, July 7, 1984, p.5. 
26 Merrill Collett, "Colombia's Drug Lords Waging War on Leftists,"The Washington 
Post, Washington, November 14, 1987, pp.14A, 22A. 
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Third, some insurgent organizations finance their activities in part by taxing the cocaine 
industry. However, they have been more successful in taxing the upstream phases of the 
industry (cultivation and low-level processing), rather than the more lucrative downstream 
phases (refining and exporting). Guerrilla organizations such as the Communist 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Comunistas) known by the 
Spanish acronym of F ARC27 in effect control the dregs of cocaine trade; the more profitable 
ends are mostly in the hands of powerful trafficking syndicates. Such syndicates apparently 
have the resources and the weaponry to protect their refining and export operations against 
predatory guerrilla groups. 
Fourth, the financial relationship between the cocaine industry and insurgent groups has 
been characterized as an alliance, but this is an overstatement. Guerrilla groups attempt to 
exploit all production assets in territories under their control. They extort ranchers, farmers, 
merchants, and even foreign multinationals whenever they see the opportunity. 
Fifth, guerrilla organizations in Colombia have built a base of political support among 
the coca-growing peasantry. Guerrilla organizations such as Colombia's FARC play on 
growers' hostility toward the U.S.-favored eradication campaign, which directly threatens 
the livelihood of many campesinos. Guerrillas also exploit the peasantry's resentment against 
cocaine middlemen, who by many accounts bully farmers into accepting rock-bottom prices 
for their coca leaves and coca paste. For most cocaine barons, the narcotics industry 
represents a way to acquire wealth and social status, not an instrument of revolutionary 
change. 
Finally, in addition to the last five important considerations, I will argue that, with the 
end of the Cold War, today it is more evident that narco-trafficking filled the guerrillas' 
financial vacuum produced by the suspension of the Soviet and Cuban aid. In drug 
production and trafficking the guerrillas found a more profitable source of financing. This 
27 The most important and largest guerrilla group of Colombia. Led since 1949, by the 
oldest guerrilla leader of the world Pedro Antonio Marin, known as "sure shot" 
(tirofijo ). This group is considered today by the Colombian military the third cocaine 
cartel of Colombia. 
18 
is evident not only because most of the illicit crops growth in the guerrillas' area of 
influence, but also, because of the unprecedented 1996 civil protests that the F ARC 
promoted among all peasants involved in production. This revolt represented not only a clear 
signal of the guerrillas' popular control, but also, the violent reaction of a group that was 
seriously wounded in its finances by the eradication campaign and the massive military 
involvement in this task. 
3. The Mafia and the Political Parties 
The ideological split dividing the political elites of Colombia began in 1810 and became 
solidified by 1850 with the official establishment of the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal-PL), 
and the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador-PC). The Liberals were anti-colonial and 
wanted to transform Nueva Granada28 into a modern nation. Those who joined the PL 
primarily came from the more recently created ascending classes and included; merchants 
who advocating free trade; manufacturers; artisans anxious to increase demand for their 
products; some small land owners, and agriculturists endorsing a liberalization of the state 
monopolies on crops such as tobacco; and slaves seeking their freedom. The Liberals also 
sought decreased executive power, separation of church and state, freedom of the press, 
education, religion, and business, and elimination of the death penalty.29 
The Conservatives wanted to preserve the Spanish colonial legacy of Roman Catholicism 
and authoritarianism. They favored prolonging colonial structures and institutions, upholding 
alliances between church and state, continuing slavery, and defending the authoritarian form 
of government that would eliminate what they saw as an excess of freedom. The PC grouped 
together slave owners, the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and large landholders. Campesinos 
were divided between the two parties, their loyalties following those of their employers or 
patrons. In contrast to the unity demonstrated by the PC, the PL developed factions from the 
start. Because of a weak military establishment and the history of violent interaction between 
28 Nueva Granada, was a unified country formed by the later states of Colombia, 
Venezuela and Ecuador. This unified Country was the life dream of Simon Bolivar, 
who fought for the independence of the Nueva Granada from Spain. 
29 Colombia: A Country Study, p.23. 
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them, the two political parties established in the nineteenth century in Colombia became 
functional alternatives of segmental divisions along religious, linguistic or ethnic lines 
present in plural societies. Although the two parties initially represented distinguishable 
ideological differences, they did not come to divide the country by class or region, as party 
members could be found in all classes and concentrated in communities in all regions of the 
country.30 
For the last two decades, members of these two political parties have had a strong 
relationship with the cocaine Mafia. These members have received narco-traffickers support, 
in order to acquire the necessary economic resources to manage their voters and divide the 
benefits of the bureaucracy. In the past, especially the PL accepted into its ranks those 
generous representatives of the emerging class such Carlos Lehder and Pablo Escobar. In 
Colombia, cocaine dealers attempted to purchase political power, contributing massive sums 
to presidential and congressional political campaigns and even offering the government huge 
cash loans.31 
4. The Marriage Between the Mafia and the Political Parties 
To understand the narco-traffickers' political strategy it is important to keep in mind that 
the Colombian Mafia grew up around a familiar local nucleus of political parties. During the 
traffickers' development, they were involved with agents from the local political parties, the 
local and regional economic groups. These are the same people that began to ascend into the 
state and national spheres. With this kind of process going on in the country, it is hard to 
understand why the people of Colombia were shocked when some individual members of the 
Cocaine Mafia pretended to be allied with traditional politicians in order to be included in 
the Senate or the House of Representatives; or, when the traffickers attempted to create their 
own political movements.32 
30 Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,l988, p.51. 
31 Colombia: A Country Study, pp.18-19. 
32 Ibid, pp.33-37. 
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One of the pioneers in the massive export of cocaine into the United States, was Carlos 
Lehder, who was also one of the first narco-traffickers to develop a political platform. This 
summarized the interest of the narco-traffickers, their own logic, and their vision of the 
society. In Lehder's words: 
Our objective is anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic, the revolution of Latin 
America could happen thanks to the Coca, because Cocaine is the Atomic Bomb 
of Latin America. 33 
Until this stage the narco-traffickers had been content to finance the political campaigns of 
candidates who agreed to support their interests. In 1982, Lehder started the "Latino National 
Movement" (Movimiento Latino Nacional) which would later change its name to "Latino 
Socialist Movement" (Movimiento Latino Socialista), thanks to the advice of one of his 
friends, a sympathizer ofthe M-19 guerrilla group.34 
Lehder' s ideology was a curious mix of extremism that was borrowed from both the left 
and the right. The MLS opposed "communism, imperialism, neocolonialism, and Zionism" 
and also maintained that "We are Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman." Lehder and his followers 
preached a Latinized version of Hitler's master race theory. Admiration for Hitler, "the 
greatest warrior of all time," was coupled with the belief in Latin superiority. At the same 
time, Lehder played to the extreme left. He talked in interviews about starting a "dialogue" 
with the leaders ofthe M-19 movement. Confidential Colombian police reports say that the 
M-19 guerrillas served intermittently as part ofLehder's personal guard force. 35 
One of the first actions of the MLS was to buy the newspaper Free Quindio (Quindio 
Libre ), which had a circulation of more than 60,000. The circulation was primarily in the 
33 Sauloy and Le Bonniec, pp.28-33. 
34 The April 19th. Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril), a pro Cuban-Nationalist 
orientation guerrilla group, especially oriented toward urban type of operations. Cited 
in Sauloy and Le Bonniec, p.29. 
35 Lee, pp.114-116. 
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coffee region. From this platform, Lehder openly attacked the "Extradition Treaty," the 
traditional political class and the private banks. One of his regular declarations synthesized 
his thinking: 
The extradition treaty is a case that violates the free auto-determination of 
people, the national sovereignty and the most evident case of an external 
intervention. We oppose the extradition of Latin-Americans and ofColombians 
to the imperialistic demands. We not only oppose. We will fight against it with 
our weapons, our ideology; with our weapons that are love, peace, education, 
culture and eventually our finances.36 
At the same time, the MLS was stepping into the political arena in the coffee zone, in the 
city of Medellin another movement arose called the "Liberal Renovation Movement" 
(Movimiento de Renovacion Liberal). The MRL was founded and directed by Pablo Escobar 
Gaviria. This movement was oriented to the young members of the Liberal Party. Its 
objectives were to fight against political corruption, and for the independence of Antioquia.37 
Escobar was taking advantage of the popularity he obtained by absorbing many social 
responsibilities through the corporation Medellin Without Slums (Medellin sin Tugurios), 
which organized public meetings during the weekends and constructed cheap houses to help 
the poor communities of Medellin. Because of this he was nick-named "the Robin Hood 
Paisa."38 He also founded a newspaper called Civic Medellin (Medellin Civico), that helped 
support his actions, and also propagated anti-imperialist sentiment and hostility against the 
political elites. Escobar's popularity and position reduced seriously the prestige of the local 
candidates. 39 
36 Quindio Libre, Armenia City, September 10, 1883, p.l. 
37 Antioquia is the biggest and wealthiest state of Colombia. Its capital is the city of 
Medellin. 
38 Dario Betancourt and Martha Garcia, Contrabandistas, Marimberos y Mafiosos, 
Historia social de la mafia en Colombia, Bogota: TM Editores, 1994, p.160. 
39 Sauloy and Le Bonniec, p.32. 
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Escobar's name was the second on the list of candidates for the House of Representatives 
by Jairo Ortega of the New Liberalism Party.40 As a result, Ortega was expelled from the 
party by Luis Carlos Galan,41 even though they both managed to be elected independently. 
Later, in the Congress, with different debates promoted by the New Liberalism, the House 
of Representatives achieved the removal of Pablo Escobar, in part because of a process that 
the Tenth Superior Judge of Medellin was pursuing against Escobar for the killing oftwo 
security agents. 42 
From the cases of Carlos Lehder and Pablo Escobar it can be concluded that the cocaine 
Mafia supported their actions on a social base, and have been successful by helping and 
influencing those sectors where the state and the traditional elites are least effective. For the 
drug lords, winning social respect, support of the different sectors and the political elites of 
every town and "pueblito" has been a major obsession. They cannot remain content with 
clandestine actions, isolated from society and in a constant condition of anxiety. 
To understand the political success of the narco-traffickers, it is important to understand 
the nature of Colombian society. In the words of the economist Jorge Gaitan: 
Colombia is a country that isolated itself, it is frozen in the nineteen century and 
was not able to construct a modem society: Its Judicial frame is out of fashion; 
its institutions usually follow the French pattern but are not adapted for the life 
of the country, it is schizophrenic. The most unequal society in Latin America 
after Brazil. The most elitist, the most hierarchist and classiest, ... 43 
40 New Liberalism was a fraction of the Liberal party directed by Luis Carlos Galan, the 
same party that directed the greatest opposition against narco-trafficking in Colombia. 
41 One of the most important figures of Colombian politics during the twentieth century. 
He was head of the New Liberalism Party, with one of the strongest positions against 
narco-trafficking. He was assassinated by the Medellin Cartel while he was 
campaigning for the presidency in Soacha, Cundinamarca, August 18, 1989. 
42 Arrieta, pp.226-229. 
43 Sauloy and Le Bonniec, p. 33 
23 
and he continues 
Colombia is a country were there is no social mobility. Drug trafficking can be 
some type of sick answer in a very rigid structure that allows one to jump the 
different phases of the social promotion.44 
The steps that the narco-traffickers took were inside the political arena, in which only the 
traditional elites were able to manage the political life of the country. These steps were not 
just the result of intimidation and corruption. The narco-traffickers have also been served by 
the different governments since the first administration of the National Front in 1958. Due 
to the influence of the narco-traffickers in political life, each government has orchestrated 
different policies with specifics laws that permit some favorable conditions for the drug 
cartels. These actions have led the country to the political instability and internal conflict that 
exist in 1996. 
Campaign contributions are one of the ways that the drug Mafias seek to extend their 
influence in the political realm. Such contributions do not in themselves ensure influence, 
but nevertheless constitute a hold of sorts over the office holders. The more open the Mafia's 
funding or, at least the more visible the candidate, the greater the likelihood of compliance. 
Drug money pervades Latin American politics in general, but the best documented cases are 
in Colombia. According to a November 28, 1983 Wall Street Journal article, an estimated 
$1 million in narcotics money supported candidates during the 1982 congressional 
campaigns. 45 
But the history of these underground relations between the narco-traffickers and the 
traditional political elites starts sometimes with narco-contributions and in other cases with 
political favoritism that is very well concealed under the text of a new law. The first 
44 Ibid. 
45 Stanley Penn, "Colombia's Drug Kings Move Freely," The Wall Street Journal, New 
York, November 28, 1983 .Cited in Information Services on Latin America, vol. 27, 
No. 05, November 1983, p.455. 
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president elected in the post-National Front period was Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (1974-78). 
He faced for the first time the threat of the narco-traffickers. Although he did not view drug 
trafficking as a serious threat at the beginning of his administration, by 1978 he recognized 
the ruinous impact that the drug industry was having on the political and economic structure 
of Colombian society. Corruption financed by the drug rings permeated all levels of the 
political system.46 
It was during this period that the government's response to the tremendous influx of 
illegal dollars into the country was an official policy or practice referred to in Colombia as 
the "sinister window" (ventanilla siniestra). The Bank of the Republic was directed to accept 
money from any source with no questions asked. As a result, Colombia became one few 
countries where the black market exchange rate for the dollar was below the official price.47 
The next government was under President Julio Cesar Turbay. He was well known 
because during his political campaign he looked for the support of the "emerging class." 
During his administration, one of the most important bastions of the Liberal party was the 
National Association of Industries ANIF (Asociacion Nacional de Industriales), led by 
Emesto Samper, which had proposed to legalize marijuana. The next president was Belisario 
Betancourt (1982-86), who signed a law of"Patrimonial Amnesty" by which the legitimacy 
obtained with this economic amnesty allowed the drug traffickers to enter into institutional 
politics. While the drug lords limited their actions to taking advantage of the market 
economy, they also generated foreign exchange and invested in the country. At the same 
time, the elites focused on how to assimilate the traffickers. However, while the leaders of 
the country agreed without much controversy to permit the return of this capital, they also 
understood that a full social and political assimilation of the narco-traffickers was 
impossible. 48 
46 Colombia: A Country Study, p.50. 
47 Bruce Porter, Cocaina, Bogota, Intermedio Editores, 1994, p.26. 
48 Ibid, p.73. 
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5. The Extradition 
Extradition treaties are, in the simplest terms, contracts or agreements where both (or all) 
parties have the same expectation. In traditional extradition proceedings, one country 
forwards a formal request pursuant to the terms of their treaty for the production of a person 
to stand trial in the requesting nation. The requested nation then complies with the request, 
the expectation being that those persons accused of a crime will be returned to the site of the 
alleged criminal act. If the crime was committed against a citizen (or property) of a nation 
but not within the nation's territory, the defendant would be sent to the country of the 
victim's citizenship. The rationale is that a nation suffers an injury when one of the citizens 
is attacked inside or outside its territory, and, therefore, has the right and obligation to extract 
the criminal penalty due. 49 
At the end ofthe 1970s, and as part of one ofthe largest programs to fight narcotics at 
the international level, the U.S. started to negotiate a new and more explicit extradition treaty 
with the most important countries in the distribution of illicit drugs in Latin America, the 
Caribbean and South East Asia. 5° One of the countries on which the U.S. focused was 
Colombia, due to its powerful cartel organizations. On September 4, 1979, the extradition 
treaty between the United States and Colombia was signed. This treaty is known as "Vance-
Barco" because it was negotiated and signed by Cyrus Vance, the U.S. Secretary of State, and 
Virgilio Barco Vargas, Colombian Ambassador to the U.S. Later the treaty was approved 
by the Colombian Congress and became Law 27 of 1980. 
The 1979 U.S.-Colombian treaty was an obviously important tool of drug enforcement. 
The purpose of the instrument, as one DEA official in Bogota put it, was to show that there 
is "No safe heaven in Colombia" for traffickers who violate the U.S. drug laws. After the 
49 Richard Allan, "Political Considerations and Extradition," Terrorism: Pragmatic 
International Deterrence and Cooperation, Boulder, Colorado: Institute for East-West 
Security Studies, 1990, pp.30-33. 
50 Jimmy Carter, Published Papers, 1977, pp.1399-1403, The U.S. war against narcotics 
intensified after President Carter in his message to the Congress in 1977, defined the 
use of illicit drugs as a major social problem. 
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death of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla in April 1984, the Colombian Government 
cooperated up to a point in implementing the treaty. By June 1987, when the treaty ceased 
to be operative, the U.S. had submitted 140 extradition requests for drug trafficking and 
related offenses: 24 of these requests had been approved, and 16 persons (14 Colombians and 
two foreigners) had actually been extradited. 51 
The poor performance of the treaty stems from Colombia's porous system of criminal 
justice. The system convicts only a small percentage of those tried for narcotics offenses, and 
those who are convicted generally tend to be the "small fries." The drug Mafia's use ofbribes 
and threats successfully neutralizes many judges. Judges are sometimes poorly trained, the 
judicial system is overloaded, and drug crimes may be reduced to misdemeanors to expedite 
cases and get people out of jail. Fernando Cepeda, former Dean of the University of the 
Andes and former Minister of the Barco Administration, strongly favored extradition as a 
counterweight to Colombia's judicial system, which he described as "a Disaster."52 
The El Tiempo columnist Roberto Posada Garcia-Pefia (D' Artagnan) called extradition: 
... the only way to convince the North American people that we are in a struggle 
to the death with the Mafia and are not tolerating its actions and incursions. 53 
Other notables such as the director of El Espectador, Gullermo Cano, favored application 
of the treaty because of the pervasive corruption of the judiciary in Colombia, which allows 
drug criminals to operate with impunity. 54 
Yet, many Colombians see extradition as an example of "Colonial" justice and 
renunciation of sovereignty. Opposition has been widespread and sometimes violent. The 
51 Lee, p.211. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Roberto Posada (D' Artagnan), "Colombia: asi nos ven," El Tiempo, Via Internet, 
Bogota, September 7, 1983, p.5. 
54 Gullermo Cano, "Libreta de Apuntes," El Espectador, Via Internet, Bogota, January 
20, 1985, p.4. 
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narcotics lobby mounted an intense propaganda campaign against extradition and may well 
have resorted to stronger measures. Colombian Supreme Court justices received anonymous 
threats that they would be killed unless they declared the treaty unconstitutional. Government 
officials received death threats for implementing the treaty. It is important to note, however, 
that anti-extradition sentiment was not just confined to the ultra nationalist fringe. Many 
people took a stand against the treaty: distinguished jurists, leaders of Cclombia' s two major 
labor unions, prominent writers and journalists, congressmen, and even government 
officials.55 
In January 1985, a report on Noticiero TV-Hoy in Bogota showed three extradited 
Colombians being delivered to Miami Federal Court in handcuffs, chains, and leg irons. The 
image of the three traffickers "Chained like beasts" in the words of Semana magazine, 
provoked wide public outrage as well as official protests from Colombia's Foreign Minister. 
The focal point for opposition within the Betancourt administration was the Attorney 
General, Carlos Jimenez Gomez, who wrote a letter to President Betancourt in November 
1984 saying that: 
Colombia must neither practice nor allow the surrender of its nationals to foreign 
justice. 56 
Jimenez petitioned the Colombian Supreme Court on eight separate occasions, each 
involving an extradition case, to declare the treaty unconstitutional. In four cases, Jimenez 
argued that the treaty violated Colombian sovereignty and in four others, challenged the 
instrument on various technical grounds. 57 
By the late 1980s, a loose coalition of about twenty Medellin-based cocaine-trafficking 
families or syndicates, known collectively as the Medellin Cartel, had demoralized 
55 Lee, p.212. 
56 
"Por Octava vez el Procurador Pide Tumbar la Extradicion,"E/ Tiempo, Via Internet, 
Bogota, October 10, 1985, p. 4. 
57 Ibid. 
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Colombia's judicial sector with narcotics-related corruption and had virtually paralyzed it 
with a campaign of terrorism and intimidation. Operating with considerable impunity, the 
Colombian drug barons arranged for the murders of more than 50 magistrates, including a 
dozen Supreme Court judges between 1981 and 1988. The "Extraditables" (Los 
Extraditables), the name adopted by the cartel drug lords, also financed the assassination by 
hired killers of government and judicial officials who favored compliance with the bilateral 
extradition treaty.58 
The drug traffickers feared extradition to the United States, where they were more likely 
to be convicted. Their victims included Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, murdered by 
the Medellin cartel; his successor as justice minister and Ambassador to Hungary, Enrique 
Parejo Gonzalez, who was seriously wounded in an assassination attempt in Budapest in 
December 1986; and Attorney General Carlos Mauro Hoyos Jimenez, who was assassinated 
in Medellin on January 25, 1988. On December 12, 198(5, the plenary Committee of the 
Supreme Court ruled that Law 27 of 1980 was unconstitutional. This law approved the 
already ratified 1979 extradition treaty. The ruling broke with a seventy-year majority 
opinion that a law approving an international treaty could not be subjected to constitutional 
revision. 59 
Since them, extradition have been a central topic of the U.S.-Colombian relationship. On 
one side, the U.S. have tried to apply all the necessary pressure to see this treaty implemented 
again. This especially because of the well known weaknesses and vulnerabilities of 
Colombian judicial system, represented in short sentences, soft economic penalties and a 
weak jailing system. On the other side, since 1991 a new Constitution was put into effect. 
It was the product of a Constitutional Assembly (Asamblea Constitucional). This constitution 
clearly established that the extradition of Colombians to be prosecuted in another country 
was against the law. Because of this, the only way extradition can be applied again is if the 
Colombian Congress produces a Constitutional Reform (Reforma Constitucional). The 
58 Lee, p.213. 
59 Ibid., p. 214. 
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procedures established by the same constitution in order to change the written text of it, are 
complicated and demand a very strong governmental and judicial pressure as well as 
Congressional debate. 
Today, the extradition issue is more complicated than ever before, especially because on 
the one hand, the U.S. Government has sent strong and clear signals through its Ambassador 
in Bogota Miles Frechette saying that extradition will be the most important fact in order to 
avoid a 1997 de-certification as well as economic sanctions. On the other hand, the 
Colombian Congress is studying the topic and its implications very slowly and carefully, 
trying to show that they do not act on U.S. pressure, and developing a sick nationalistic 
posture around this topic. This type of behavior is due to a real and permanent fear of narco-
terrorism, that can clearly be one of the narco-traffickers responses, but especially because 
of the U.S. posture over the narco-scandal process in which the Clinton administration 
publicly condemn the results of the Congressional inquiry against President Samper by 
saying that the Colombian Congress was clearly corrupted and incapable of fighting against 
drug traffickers. 
6. Corruption 
The cocaine Mafia has been called a "Clear and present danger to the survival of 
democratic institutions," and a "first-order geopolitical threat." Such characterizations, 
however, are not entirely accurate. Unlike guerrillas, whose objective is seizing power, 
traffickers are not ultimately interested in destroying the social order that nurtures them. Just 
like mafia organizations elsewhere, the Colombian mafia basically seeks to prosper 
commercially without being disturbed. However, when an industry as large as the cocaine 
industry searches for protection, corruption is spawned on a massive and unprecedented 
scale. Cocaine traffickers have been brought into the political system and can successfully 
manipulate key institutions- the political parties, press, police, and judiciary.60 
Cocaine traffickers use combinations of the carrot and stick to influence drug 
enforcement policies. The Colombian Mafias use coercive tactics against officials who are 
60 Helms, p.208. 
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"uncooperative" or who publicly condemn their activities. Yet, traffickers prefer to use 
financial blandishments - bribes, donations, and charitable activities to achieve their ends. 
Money is by far the Mafia's most important political weapon; with it, the Mafia buys 
protection from law enforcement officials, corrupt the political establishment, and builds a 
public following, especially among poorer classes. Violence is usually the last resort- that 
is, it is used against the policeman, judge, or politician who cannot be bought. Yet, Mafia-
sponsored violence against government and judicial representatives have been a common 
feature of the Colombian political scene.61 
According to the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, corruption is the greatest single 
impediment to a successful on counter-narcotics effort in Colombia.62 Today, high-level 
government officials, members of congress, judicial officials, and government functionaries 
are under investigation for corrupt activities. Corruption, narcotic interests, with their vast 
sums of illegally acquired funds, are influencing the political, judicial and legislative 
processes. Narco-corruption of the Colombian Congress continues to be a problem. There 
are continuing allegations of the Cali Cartel influence over members of Congress. In late 
September 1994, the senior Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent in Colombia, 
Mr. Joe Toft, publicly asserted that some 50 to 75 percent of the Colombian congress are 
under the influence of the drug cartels. 63 
The Mafia's power is extraordinary. Enrique Parejo, Colombia's Minister of Justice 
under Belisario Betancourt, remarked: 
61 Arrieta, p.222. 
62 Joseph E. Kelley, "Drug War, Observations on U.S. International Drug Control 
Efforts," United States General Accounting Office, Washington D.C., August 1, 1995, 
p.9. 
63 Mary Beth Sheridan, "Tained Donations Date Back 13 Years in Samper Campaigns," 
The Miami Herald, November 6, 1995. Cited in Information Services on Latin 
America, vol. 50, no. 11, November 1995, p.166. 
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... at one time or another, in one way or another, all state organizations suffered 
the corruption of narcotics traffickers.64 
President Belisario Betancourt called the cocaine mafia: 
... an organization stronger than the state.65 
Today the problem of narco-related corruption is one of the biggest problems that 
undermines Colombia's development. The challenge is for the Colombian people to rid their 
system ofnarco-corruption and save their democracy. Colombians are justifiably proud of 
their democracy, but it has in recent years been riddled from top to bottom with the 
corruption influence of drug money. This narco-corruption is a threat to both the rule of law 
in Colombia and to the vital interest of the U.S.66 
7. The Ernesto Samper Government 
President Ernesto Samper Pizano forms part of a new generation of Colombians who, 
with an ambitious vision of change, burst into politics in the last decade. Shortly after 
Ernesto Samper's election to the presidency in May 1994, credible allegations surfaced that 
his campaign had received up to $6 million in contributions from the Cali Cartel. Cassette 
recordings of conversations between a Colombian journalist and a Cali leader discussing 
drug cartel contributions to Samper's presidential election campaign became public. U.S. 
officials did not dismiss the charges and said that they were looking into them. President-
elect Samper promised his own investigation into his campaign finances. Colombia's 
Attorney General verified the authenticity of the so-called narco-cassettes; however, he 
64 
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insisted that the tape only demonstrated that a contribution was offered, not that it was 
accepted, and thus, the Liberal Party was absolved of any wrongdoing. 67 
During his inauguration address on August 7, 1994 in Bolivar Square Samper stated: 
The struggle against drug trafficking, corruption and organized crime will 
continue to have priority concern during my administration. We fight and will 
continue to fight drug trafficking for conviction, for the serious ·harm it has 
caused upon the Colombian society, for its impact on our institutions and because 
we share the universal desire that there be a youth free from the threat of 
narcotics.68 
The same day he said that the operations against the cartels would continue, and that his 
government was planning to extend the struggle to the economic front by fighting money 
laundering. 
On February 6, 1995, at the same time that President Sam per presented the results of the 
drug war during the fist six months of his administration, he announced the new Colombian 
strategy against drugs. In his words: 
The extension of the challenge outlined by drug trafficking, demands an integral 
policy to fight it. We cannot continue the game of actions and reactions, full of 
doubts and uncertainty on the effectiveness of what we are doing. 69 
The government's integral policy was composed often major strategies: crop eradication, 
alternative development plans, attacking industrial drug production, drug distribution, money 
laundering, the threat of local consumption, law enforcement and surrender to justice, 
67 Sheridan, p.164. 
68 Ernesto Samper Pizano, "The Time of the People", Inauguration Address of the 
President, Bogota, Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, August 7, 1994, p.10-12. 
69 Ernesto Samper Pizano, "Colombia's Policy Against Drugs," Address at the 
presentation of the Policy Against Drugs, Bogota, Presidencia de la Republica, Office 
ofthe President, February 6, 1995, p.36. 
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changes injustice administration, persecution to the cartels, and international participation 
and responsibility. 70 
Unfortunately for President Samper, at the same time he was taking major actions against 
the cartels a major political scandal was starting when his campaign treasurer was arrested 
in July 1995. Stunning the nation, Santiago Medina testified that the Samper campaign had 
received at least $6 million from the Cali Cartel, perhaps half the campaign budget. In 
exchange he said, Samper promised to ease conditions for the surrender of the drug lords.71 
Samper has responded to allegations about drug money in his campaign by pointing to 
his government crackdown on the cartel, launched last spring. He told Cable News Network 
CNN in an interview in August 1995: 
If this infiltration (of drug money) happened, in no way- I repeat- no way did 
this compromise the political will of my government in the fight against drug 
trafficking.72 
At the time President Samper was giving this interview, he had the following record against 
drug trafficking that strongly support his argument: 
• An unprecedented crackdown on the Cali Cartel put the six top kingpins behind 
bars and effectively dismantled the world's most notorious criminal organization. 
• During 1995, Colombia destroyed more than 65,000 acres of coca and poppy 
crops as part of the hemisphere's most ambitious drug-crop eradication program 
ever. 
• The government took strong military action to eliminate large-scale trafficking on 
San Andres Island, once a major transshipment point for drugs. 
• Authorities shut down more than 380 labs, stepped up interdiction of drug 
shipments, and targeted the precursor chemicals used to make drugs. 
70 Ibid., pp. 36-40. 
71 Sheridan, p.l64. 
72 Ibid. 
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• Finally, on June 1995 President Samper signed Colombia's first law against 
money laundering. 73 
Even though the results from the Colombian point of view were important, a new 
development occurred. In August 1995, Fernando Botero, the manager ofPresident Samper's 
1994 election campaign and formerly his Defense Minister, was arrested shortly after his 
resignation in connection with charges that the campaign was financed by contributions from 
narco-traffickers. In December 1995, President Samper was absolved of personal 
responsibility in accepting narco-contributions by the Congress Accusations Committee. At 
the time this decision was made no further evidence implicated President Samper in the 
scandal. But after a few months in jail, and especially when former Minister of Defense 
Botero realized that his personal judicial situation was getting worse, he decided to publicly 
contradict what he has been denying for months: President Samper knew and approved the 
narco-contributions to his campaign. This action was considered a major event in the course 
of the narco-scandal and as a result of this a second congressional inquiry was opened amid 
considerable public discussion over its ability to carry out a viable proceeding. 
Since Colombia was de-certified by the U.S. on March 1996, Samper has been accused 
by Colombia's Chief Prosecutor Alfonso Valdivieso of accepting more than $6 million in 
contributions from the Cali cartel. He also has been under daily attack by the national and 
international press. Even with half of the country against him, Samper is still politically alive. 
A description by Ramon Mestre a member of the Miami Herald editorial board, given 
months ago, can be used to described the Colombian President's political ability: 
Ernesto Samper skillfully has survived several political earthquakes while 
sidestepping the cracks in the earth that are opening around him.74 
73 Sonia Duran de Infante, "Samper's Drug Fight, Campaign are Clean," Miami Herald, 
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President Samper survived two inquires by the Colombian Congress Accusations 
Committee. When the second investigation concluded and he was found for a second time 
not guilty, the investigation was finally closed, receiving major congressional support. After 
this event, in mid-June 1996, President Samper announced major changes in Colombian 
posture against narco-trafficking, most of them favoring U.S. strategies-. With this decision 
he was trying to convince the Clinton administration, that despite the 1996 drug de-
certification, Colombia would be fully cooperative with the U.S. on the drug war, and in this 
way a 1997 re-certification of the country could be achieved. 
Although the congressional inquiry declared President Samper innocent of knowing 
about the infiltrations of $6 million in his campaign, the U.S. response to this Congressional 
verdict was to cancel the President's visa to enter into the United States to publicly disqualify 
this decision. On one side, this action seriously affected the image of Colombia overseas, 
decreasing international legitimacy to his government and weakening Colombia's posture 
in all the international forums and organizations. On the other side, the U.S. response helped 
the President locally, creating a stronger anti U.S. sentiment, generated more popular 
support for his government (his image rose 15 percent), a support that he was needing at the 
very moment the regime legitimacy was in question in the middle of a severe instability 
crisis. 
In September 1996, President Samper received a special permit to be able to visit the 
United Nations in New York for the annual address, where he proposed an unprecedented 
agenda for global action against illegal narcotics. The Samper plan calls for the creation of 
a group of experts to develop a timetable and action plan. The six issues that President 
Sam per highlighted for consideration by world leaders were the following: 75 
• Economic and social initiatives to support drug substitution. 
• Control on the trafficking of chemical precursors and arms. 
• Mandates to control money laundering. 
75 Barbara Crossette, "War on Drugs Urged at U.N. By President of Colombia," The New 
York Times, New York, September 24, 1996, p.A-5. 
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• Worldwide intelligence agreements for cooperation against the drug trafficking 
network. 
• Programs to effectively curb demand. 
• A global treaty of judicial cooperation. 
The U.S. State Department's response to the Colombian President's address at U.N. 
clearly reflects the impression the Clinton administration has about the Sam per's 
administration: 
Colombia needed to think less about international solutions and more on its 
internal mess.76 
Today, it is clear that the relationship between the Clinton and Samper administrations is not 
the best. As a result of this, in a recent forum of academics and experts on the topic held in 
Bogota, they warn about the high probability that exists for a new de-certification in March 
1997, this time with economic sanctions.77 This is in part because the new certification 
depends on the Colombian Congresses' actions by re-establishing extradition and creating 
stronger laws against narco-traffickers. It is evident that until now there is not a clear 
movement in this direction. 
The sad history of drugs and politics, of violence and self-destruction have been the path 
that brought Colombia to de-certification. De-certification is the result of this historical 
process. Although the U.S. de-certification has not caused a major impact yet, in part 
because the U.S. did not want to, it is also clear that this sanction has a major impact on 
Colombia's democracy, image and credibility. This international sanction was the dividing 
point of Colombia's present history. The author argues that the study of the country will be 
divided from now on, as the events before and after the de-certification. For a better 
understanding of this topic, in the next chapter the author explains what is de-certification. 
76 Ibid. 
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III. THE DE-CERTIFICATION 
A. WHAT IS DE-CERTIFICATION? 
The annual certification is a process managed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement ofthe Department of State. It is important 
to understand that this process is not simply a one day or even a one month event. On the 
contrary, it is the product of a careful study in which the individual country's results are 
taken into account. The U.S. government works with those countries that must be certified 
each year, making clear U.S. expectations, providing assistance when appropriate, and 
alerting them to problems. The standards are very high because they have to be, and other 
governments know this. The Foreign Assistance Law written in 1961 is very clear. Even so, 
the U.S. President's final certification decisions are difficult because they demand frank and 
honest assessments of the performance of other governments not individuals, not bureaus, 
but entire governments. 
According to Ambassador Robert Gel bard, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement of the Department of State: 
The certification is one of the most powerful tools the President ofthe United 
States has to focus international attention on the narcotic's threat and achieve 
results. The Foreign Assistance Act requires that each year the President identify 
the major drug-producing and drug-transit countries and determines whether they 
have fully cooperated with the United States or taken adequate steps on their own 
narcotics control. The United States must cut off most foreign assistance to those 
countries that they do not certify and vote against their request for loans from 
multilateral banks. 78 
The certification procedure was written in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amendment 
(22 U.S.C., section 2291). The law clearly specifies what type of actions the U.S. considers 
to be cooperative with its own policy against narco-trafficking. These actions are described 
78 Gelbard, pp.337-342. 
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in Section 490 A. Annual Certification Procedure After September 30, 1995. Among those 
actions we can mention: 
• By satisfying the goals agreed to in an applicable bilateral or multilateral narcotics 
agreement with the United States, this includes: 
• Reduce drug production, drug consumption, and drug trafficking within 
its territory, including activities to address illicit crop eradication and crop 
substitution. 
• Increase drug interdiction and enforcement. 
• Increase drug treatment. 
• Increase the identification of and elimination of illicit drug laboratories. 
• Increase the identification of, and elimination of trafficking in, essential 
precursor chemicals for use in the illicit production of narcotic and 
psychotropic drugs and other control substances. 
• Increase cooperation with U.S. drug enforcement officials. 
• Increase participation in extradition treaties, mutual legal assistance, 
provisions directed at money laundering, sharing of evidence, and other 
initiatives for cooperative drug enforcement. 
• By preventing narcotics and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances 
produced or processed, in whole or in part, in such country, from being sold 
illegally within the jurisdiction of such country to the United States Government 
personnel or their dependents or from being transported, directly or indirectly, into 
the United States. 
• By preventing and punishing the laundering in that country of drug related profits 
or drug related moneys. 
• By preventing and punishing bribery and other forms of public corruption which 
facilitate the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic 
drugs and other controlled substances, or which discourage the investigation and 
prosecution of such acts.79 
79 
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B. TYPES OF CERTIFICATION 
The law provides the President of the U.S. with three types of certification. According 
to this procedures a country can be:80 
• "Certify," when in the administration's opinion a country is fully cooperating 
with the U.S. and/or is taking adequate steps on its own to meet the goals and 
objectives stated in the 1988 U.N. Convention on drugs. 
• "Conditionally Certify," when a country whose counter-narcotics performance 
does not qualify for a full certification. In this case the President may grant a 
"Vital National Interest Certification." This is done when the United States 
national interest outweighs the risk of less than full cooperation, in this case 
foreign assistance will remain unchanged. 
• "De-certify," when the President denies Certification as a result of non-
cooperation with U.N. and U.S. drug control strategies. 
These categories of certification, represent the intensity in which those countries 
threatened the U.S. national interests and is "transitory." The degree of interest involved 
usually depends on the President's perception of the international environment within which 
the United States conducts foreign policy and on his judgement of the political climate in the 
United States. The United States national interest have a four-scale intensity: 
• survival interest, where the very existence of the nation is in peril; 
• vital interests, where probably serious harm to the security and well-being of the 
nation will result if strong measures, including military ones, are not taken by the 
government within a short period of time; 
• major interests, where potential serious harm could come to the nation if no action 
is taken to counter and unfavorable trend abroad; 
• peripheral (minor) interests, where little if any harm to the entire nation will result 
if a "wait and see" policy is adopted. 81 
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On March 1995, Colombia received a "Vital National Interest Certification" for its 1994 
effort against drug-trafficking. At that time there were few political implications in this 
decision and the Clinton administration was trying to balance results and failures. The U.S. 
government was especially frustrated because the expected diminution in the movement and 
flow of narcotics originating in Colombia as a result of the destruction of the Medellin 
syndicate in 1993 did not materialize. It is apparent that the removal ofPablo Escobar and 
his drug empire from the Colombian narcotics scene only benefited the now-dominant 
syndicate headquartered in the city of Cali. 82 Despite some successes as well as failures on 
Colombia's side, the Clinton administration's justification for this type of certification in 
1995 was, in the author's opinion, a clear perception of reality: 
Vital U.S. national interest would be at risk if we were to deny Colombia 
certification. As Colombia is the primary source of cocaine to the United States, 
continued cooperation with the government of Colombia is very important to this 
country. A vital national interest certification will ensure that the U.S. policy and 
assistance remain focused on developing more effective Colombian anti-drug 
efforts.83 
Furthermore, in March 1995 the Clinton administration clearly understood the 
implications of denying certification to Colombia: 
While the government of Colombia needs to do more in its efforts against drugs, 
the decrease in narcotics cooperation that would likely attend denial of 
certification would result in even more narcotics entering this country. De-
certification would result in strident nationalistic calls on the government of 
Colombia to cease its counter-narcotics cooperation with the U.S. In short, the 
risks associated with denying certification to Colombia are greater than the risks 
associated with Colombia's failure in the last year to cooperate fully with the 
United States, or to take adequate steps on its own, to combat narcotics.84 
82 
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," Via Internet, March 1995, p.18. 
83 Ibid, p.20. 
84 Ibid, p.21. 
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Although the 1995 certification was conditioned under the "vital national interest" type of 
certification, the Government of Colombia was unable to understand that this political and 
diplomatic signal was the first step towards the 1996 de-certification of the country. The 
Colombian government's response to the 1995 certification was the declaration of war 
against the Cali cartel. This posture was welcomed by the Clinton administration and at the 
time considered a difficult and almost impossible accomplishment. However, Samper's 
administration thought this was the right strategy to avoid a possible de-certification in 1996. 
Even with the unprecedented efforts of Colombian democratic institutions to capture six 
of the top seven members of the Cali syndicate, the United States decided that these law 
enforcement efforts did not outweigh the lack of political will of Sam per's government to 
combat the drug cartels. Although this seems contradictory, the overall Colombian strategy 
did not satisfy the U.S. government. In 1996 a more complex political situation developed, 
in which Samper' s narco-scandal, as well as President Clinton re-election, were in question. 
C. THE 1996 PROCESS OF CERTIFICATION 
In 1996 the President of the United States certified 22 of the 31 countries eligible as fully 
cooperating with the United States in counter-drug efforts and/ or taking adequate steps on 
their own to meet the goals and objectives stated in the 1988 U.N. Convention on Drugs. The 
countries certified were: Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico,\ 
Panama, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Both Bolivia and Peru received 
a vital national interest certification in 1995. They improved their performance and in 1996 
were certified by the president as fully cooperating. In 1996 President Clinton granted vital 
national interest certifications to three countries: Lebanon, Paraguay, and Pakistan. At the 
same time, he denied certifications to six countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Iran, 
Nigeria, and Syria. 
On March 1, 1996, Colombia was de-certified because in the U.S. point of view, it was 
not fully cooperating with the United States as agreed to in bilateral counter-narcotics 
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agreements, or as having taken adequate steps on its own to achieve full compliance with the 
goals and objectives established by the 1988 United Nations Convention against illicit traffic 
in narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances. The decision to decertify Colombia was not 
made lightly, according to Ambassador Robert Gelbard: 
It is crystal clear, however, that narcotics interests have gained unprecedented 
footholds in Colombia, undermining much of the progress that Colombia's most 
motivated public servants could have made. There is no doubt at this point that 
the Samper campaign receives significant financing from Colombian drug lords. 
This has been publicly acknowledged. 85 
He continues: 
The U.S. government did not prejudge the Samper administration's effort on 
drugs, but neither could it ignore the facts at hand. The test of the law is whether 
the government of Colombia is cooperating in a counter-drug struggle. In the 
President's opinion, there was insufficient cooperation.86 
According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report of 1996 in its statement 
of explanation, the United States decertified Colombia for the following considerations:87 
• In 1995-1996, Colombia remained the world's leading producer and distributor 
of cocaine and major supplier of heroin and marijuana. 
• Colombia was given a vital national interest certification in 1994-1995. 
• President Samper' s administration lacked commitment to support efforts of 
Colombian law enforcement entities and to strengthen the nation's institutions to 
combat the destructive effects of narcotics traffickers. 
• The Cali cartel continued to manage its criminal empire from prison, and the 
security of the Colombian prison system remains woefully inadequate. 
85 
"International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," 1996, p.96. 
86 Ibid., p.97. 
87 Ibid, "Statement ofExplanation," 1996, pp.1-2. 
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• The Colombian government failed to pass legislation to increase the penalties for 
drug trafficking. 
• The Colombian government did not strengthen asset seizure and forfeiture law 
and took no legislative steps to further safeguard the confidentiality of 
investigative information provided by the United States in order to protect the 
lives of witnesses and the integrity of evidence. 
• The Colombian government failed to enter into a bilateral maritime counter-
narcotics agreement with the United States. 
• The Colombian law enforcement efforts, and those of the judicial sector, were 
significantly undercut by the corrosive impact of drug-related corruption. 
• The positive impact of the actions of the General Prosecutor Office and National 
Police was undermined by members of the Sam per administration, who publicly 
attacked the Prosecutor General and thwarted their own stated drug control policy. 
D. AUTOMATIC AND DISCRETIONAL SANCTIONS 
For Colombia, the 1996 de-certification had two main consequences one was immediate, 
and refers to automatic sanctions. The other, which is long-term, includes measures that the 
White House may adopt in a discretional way. The immediate sanctions were: cutting off 
economic assistance for development plans, cutting off military aid funds that average $62 
million annually, denying banks special financing programs for military acquisitions, voting 
against new loans to Colombia in six multi1aterallending institutions; under de-certification, 
the U.S. is required to vote against new loans to Colombia in such fora. About $800 million 
in loans were due to come under consideration in 1996 at the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank. The U.S. has only a minority vote in these institutions, but if 
it decides to get tough, it could pressure other countries to join in voting against funds for 
Colombia. De-certification also prohibits the U.S. Export-Import Bank from granting loans. 
This decision will affect up to $1 billion in financing, mainly in credits to the energy sector. 
Another $600 million in loans and insurance coverage by the Overseas Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) were canceled for the development of private sector projects. This 
implies a loss of $1 Billion. Also, de-certification cancels guarantees given by the 
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International Insurance Corporation to U.S. private companies investing in Colombia, a 
sanction that affects $450 million in business to Colombia.88 
There are discretional sanctions that could be applied to Colombia. The United States 
could remove preferential tariffs granted to Colombia under the Andean Trade Preferences 
Act (ATPA) and benefits ofthe Generalized System ofPreferences. ATPA includes 6,000 
products and G.S.P. includes 2,100 goods. Another option open to the U.S. is the removal 
of most-favored-nation status, which could lead to the imposition of tariffs on up to $ 1 
billion worth of Colombian exports.89 Also, as an extreme measure, the White House could 
restrict Colombian Airlines from entering the United States. In the financial sector, agencies 
that determine risk factors (Duff and Phelps, Moody's, Standad and Poor's)90 for investment 
in Colombia, could increase their peril factor, affecting the issuance of international bonds 
of Colombia in U.S. banks. Also, decertification could affect Colombia's international 
financial credibility by the low scores in risk investing factors. Colombia's economic growth 
for 1996, projected at 4.4%, will decrease to 3.8% according to the Colombian Development 
Agency (Fedesarrollo).91 
Other implications that derive from the decertification of Colombia in counter narcotic 
performance are the internal reactions of the Colombian political system. The system has 
serious problems of governability due to the charges that President Samper received money 
from the drug cartels in his presidential campaign, and also due to the fact that various 
members of the Colombian Congress are under investigation for similar charges.92 
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The 1996 de-certification of Colombia was the result of an historical process. This large 
chain of events finally "filled the cup" of the United States. At the same time this political, 
economic and moral sanction was the reflection oftoday's U.S.-Colombian relationships, 
relations that during the Clinton and Samper administrations have been less diplomatic and 
clearly less cooperative, a pattern that in the author's opinion will continue as a result of 
President Clinton's re-election and President Samper's continuation in power. It is clear that 
this bilateral relationship has been framed lately around drug trafficking. Unfortunately for 
Colombians, narco-trafficking is today the topic that unites and separates the two countries. 
However, it is because of these problems that there is a need to confront drug trafficking at 
the international level, understanding that a unilateral drug control strategy by the United 
States is not the solution. The unilateral approach to counter drug-trafficking, will favor the 
drug cartels as well as the millions of cocaine consumers world wide. On the other hand, it 
will seriously harm Colombian democracy as well as the U.S. national interest. This was 
clearly expressed in March 1995 in the U.S. justification for a vital interest certification of 
Colombia. The situation has not changed, and the same threats to both countries remain. 
These arguments lead the author to study the impact of this unilateral drug control 
strategy on Colombia's democracy. This impact cannot be under estimated and on the 
contrary will affect not only the war on drugs, but other major issues of the bilateral agenda, 
such as human rights, free trade and international cooperation.. This impact is seriously 
threatening not only Colombian democratic institutions, but the social project of Colombia 
as a nation. The following chapter will study this impact and its consequences. My intention 
is to provide a different perspective of this U.S.-Colombian relationship in the search for 
solutions to this huge and difficult problem. 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE DE-CERTIFICATION ON DEMOCRACY 
In his book Polyarchy, Robert A. Dahl discusses a number of important concepts that 
can help to develop an understanding of the difficulties of any democracy in the international 
environment. He argues that: 
The destiny of a country is never wholly in the hands of its own people. In some 
cases, domination imposed by people from outside the country can be so decisive 
as to override the effects of all the other conditions for democracy. 93 
This chapter will argue that the United States, while trying to achieve its political 
objectives through the de-certification process, which seeks to remove Ernesto Samper from 
the Presidency of Colombia, did not consider sufficiently the negative impact that this 
decision would have on the consolidation of Colombian democracy. I will argue that this 
outcome is perhaps an unintended consequence of the U.S. policy. However, I will say that 
even unintended consequences must be taken into account by the U.S. when taking this type 
of decision, especially because according to Dahl: 
... an act of foreign domination like this frequently produces a boomerang effect.94 
This boomerang effect may result in the weakening of Colombian democracy. 
Furthermore, de-certification has been considered by the Colombian people as an act of 
aggression, and at the same time has created a very strong nationalist sentiment in Colombia 
that has not been seen before. These factors can contribute seriously to a retreat in the thirty 
year progress of the U.S. effort to promote democracy and American values throughout the 
world, particularly among its neighbors in Latin America. 
93 Dahl,p.189. 
94 Ibid., p.198. 
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Even so, a developing country like Colombia cannot avoid understanding the importance 
of having an excellent relationship with the only super-power that remains after the Cold 
War. It is also true that many times the United States has perceived Colombian democracy 
as a narcocracy. However, I will argue that this form of administration-is unlikely and that 
the United States ought to understand that: 
... governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, 
irresponsible, dominated by special interest, and incapable of adopting policies 
demanded by the public good. These qualities may make such governments 
undesirable but do not make them undemocratic.95 
Today, it can be argued that Colombian democracy is in danger, not specifically because 
of the U.S. de-certification, but, because there is a mix of problems: guerrilla, narco-
trafficking, corruption, civil disorder and violence. Often, these problems are present in all 
societies at some time, but it is unusual for them to be present at the same time as they are 
now in Colombia. This mixture of internal violence and turmoil, plus the difficulties of the 
international environment represented by political, moral, and economic sanctions, or the 
silence of other allies, are leading up to the final test for the survivability of Colombia 
democracy. The worst aspect of this scenario is that normally the only groups or sectors that 
may benefit from this outcome are those groups on the outside oflaw and order. 
The actual situation in Colombia is the product of what Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and 
Seymour Martin Lipset characterize in the following terms: 
... 'the institutional decay and instability' experienced during the 1980s and 
1990s by such long-standing democracies as India, Venezuela and Colombia, 
emphasize that the legitimation and consolidation of democratic institutions is 
95 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993, p.10. 
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not necessarily a permanent achievement but requires continuous adjustment, 
reform, and renewal to maintain. 96 
The de-certification itself is a tool that may persuade a country to go in the direction the 
United States is pointing, toward a more strong posture against drug producing and drug 
trafficking. This posture in the U.S. point of view, should be clearly reflected in a strong 
counter drug national strategy. Also, it may lead democracy into the pro~ess of searching for 
new options, reforms and laws, that in time will create more legitimacy and international 
respect for the country. On the other hand it may lead to another outcome as related by 
Diamond: 
Historically, the industrialized democracies have been ambivalent about fostering 
democracy abroad and have often seen it in their interest to support authoritarian 
regimes, as well as to sanction, subvert, and overthrow popularly elected ones 
that appeared unfriendly to their geopolitical interest.97 
After almost a year of the U.S. de-certification of Colombia, the impact on the country 
and its democracy have been more negative than positive. As a result of this there are several 
institutions as well as social sectors that were weakened, in some cases directly in others 
indirectly related to the de-certification. However, in the author's opinion the core impact on 
the state institutions have been negative. To support this argument it is important to mention 
a list of the specific impacts of de-certification. 
• Impact on the international legitimacy of President Emesto Sam per government, 
affecting seriously the international image and credibility of the whole country. 
• Impact on the economy, due to a climate of uncertainty and fear that has already 
prevented foreign investment in the country. This impact deprives American 
investors of several trade-facilitating forms of U.S. credit, diminishes the flow of 
legitimate foreign capital, hurts the economy, and ironically could drive more 
Colombians to work in the drug trade. Further punitive measures could devastate 
96 Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in Developing 
Countries, Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1995, p.IO. 
97 Ibid., p.49. 
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a large number of Florida entrepreneurs doing millions of dollars in legal trade 
annually with Colombia and accounting for thousands of Florida jobs. 
• Impact on nationalism, due to the course the narco-scandal took since the U.S. de-
certification. The internal process that was leading perhaps towards the 
resignation ofPresident Samper changed dramatically. Today, the process is seen 
from the nationalistic perspective against U.S. impositions. 
• Impact on guerrillas' ideology. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Colombian 
guerrillas lost their political platform. Today, and because of the de-certification 
and the narco-scandal, they are able to find a new and credible discourse against 
U.S. intervention. 
• Impact on internal political balance of power, due to tensions between the three 
branches of the government, the executive, the legislative and judicial branches, 
a confrontation that has reached levels never seen before. Unfortunately, the U.S. 
has helped to make this struggle worse. On one side, the U.S. argues that the 
executive and legislative branches are corrupted by narco-trafficking, and that the 
Congressional decision concluding that Samper was innocent of receiving narco-
money during his campaign was not correct. On the other side, the U.S. argues 
that the General Prosecutor Office is an honest institution. This position has also 
divided the judicial system of Colombia. As a result of this, investigations 
between branches of government have been conducted, resulting in a struggle 
between the branches. 
• Impact on the drug cartels, as that the governmental impetus against the cartels 
was lost. The most important achievement against narco-trafficking, the capture 
and imprisonment of the Cali cartel leaders, is now the last priority within this 
political struggle. This is permitting the cartels to observe the democratic 
institutions fighting each other, while they rebuild their empire and divide into 
small cartels. 
• Impact on civilian behavior. In part because of the de-certification, but also 
because of the probability of economic sanctions, Colombia has started the · 
largest campaign of illegal crop eradication. As a result of this, we have seen the 
biggest and most violent civil protest and civil disobedience in recent Colombian 
history, producing hundreds of peasants injured and many deaths. These events 
have permitted guerrillas to influence the masses for their political advantage and 
to obtain unprecedented support. 
• Impact on the military forces. Because the military is trying to maintain law and 
order, but is now involved in a drug war that has to be fought on various fronts, 
spread throughout the nation, it has had to take strong positions, sometimes 
entering into the political arena. Worst of all, the military for the first time is 
ignoring some judicial mandates regarding the handling of these civilian revolts. 
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This position is exacerbating the war between the executive and judicial systems 
and leaving the country in an even more unstable situation. 
• Impact on the constitution. The United States has urged the Colombian 
government to implement the extradition law, but this cannot occur until the 
Congress produces a constitutional reform. Today, the Colombian Congress is 
studying and debating this reform. However, the extradition review may lead to 
other major changes in the 1991 Constitution. Among these changes, the 
executive and the legislative branches want to move backwards by putting the 
judicial system again under the control of the executive, voiding its independence 
and its struggle against corruption. 
The following chart summarizes briefly the type of impact the author sees on different 
institutions and sectors: 
Table 1. De-certification Impact 
INST/SECTORIGROUP DE-CERTIFICATION IMPACT 
(+) (-) (+-) 
Presidency )( 
Congress )( 
General Prosecutor Office )( 
General Attorney Office )( 
Military Forces )( 








A. COLOMBIAN DEMOCRATIC PATH 
In this chapter, my intention is to provide an understanding of the country's struggle for 
democracy. In Colombia, the state, government, institutions and the population are very 
proud of being one of the oldest democracies in Latin America. At the same time, Colombia 
has one of the most disciplined and respected military forces in the region. But, are these 
popular beliefs true? Is Colombia a real democracy? Has Colombia really constructed and 
consolidated a democracy after the military regime of 1953-57? Can Colombians be proud 
of the type of d~mocracy they have constructed? The sharper the focus of this study on 
democracy in Colombia, the better the understanding that the goals of Colombian democracy 
are not easily achieved and that the probability is that the popular belief is not true. 
To understand today's Colombian democracy it is necessary to go back almost fifty years 
to study a very important process of Colombia's recent history now as the National Front. 
Colombia is the product of what was Arend Lijphart called "consociational democracy."98 
The National Front is an experiment that changed dramatically the history of the country. It 
was the product of various intervening variables: violence, a military government and elite 
settlement. Furthermore, according to Jonathan Hartlyn: 
In Colombia, the consociational National Front regime established in 1958 was 
an elite response to a perceived crisis stemming from the fear of exclusion from 
power by the military government, potentially revolutionary violence in the 
countryside and economic stagnation. 99 
98 Term used to describe the nature ofthe political process and the type of political 
regime found in the Netherlands, as well as other countries such as Austria, 
Switzerland and Belgium. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World 
Politics, January 21, 1969. Cited in Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in 
Colombia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p.8. 
9~ Hartlyn, p. 3. 
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1. The Military Regime 
In 1949, Laureano Gomez of the Conservative party (CP) won the presidency in an 
election that the Liberal party boycotted. Two weeks prior to this election, President Mariano 
Ospina (also from the CP) closed the Congress, in which liberals held the majority, because 
of the continual turmoil following a shootout in Congressional chambers. Liberal leaders, 
who had participated in Ospina's administration resigned, and although direct evidence is 
lacking, they condoned if not organized guerrilla activity of rural liberal partisans just as 
Gomez was elected. 100 Gomez came into office determined to suppress these Liberal guerrilla 
partisans. In Gomez's view, these armed bands were not partisans in a feud with conservative 
citizens but subversives attempting to destroy the Colombian state and Christian society. 101 
Thus, Gomez felt justified in using the Colombian military forces directly against Liberal 
guerrillas. 
President Gomez tended to equate loyalty to the state with support for the Conservative 
party. The Colombian Army became increasingly subjected to tests of its partisan political 
loyalty. He removed "unreliable" officers from sensitive positions, and he required troop 
commanders to report on the political affiliation of their troops. As a result, some liberal 
officers and troops deserted or collaborated with the liberal irregulars. Even the Military 
Academy, a bastion of professional training and nonpartisanship, became heavily politicized, 
and a political endorsement was an unofficial but indispensable prerequisite of admission.102 
Nevertheless, the politization of the army's domestic peacekeeping finally led to a break 
between the President and the armed forces' senior leadership. Furthermore, according to 
Hartlyn: 
100 Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973, p.6. 
101 Ibid., p.59. 
102 Monsignor German Guzman, Orlando Fals Borda and Eduardo Umaiia Luna, La 
Violencia en Colombia, Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1962-1964, Vol. 1, pp.263-
270. 
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Regime breakdown in 1949, although fueled by social and economic change, and 
particularly by mass mobilization following Gaitan's death, was fundamentally 
the result of elite fragmentation and the breakdown of elites negotiations. 103 
As a result of this crisis, Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla carried out a coup d'etat 
on June 13, 1953, as Gomez was attempting to remove him from his post as Commander of 
the armed forces. Widespread sentiment in favor of a coup had been builaing for over a year. 
Rojas' action was welcomed by both the liberal and conservative elements, who increasingly 
opposed Gomez's autocratic style of leadership. 104 
The Rojas coup was the turning point of Colombian military strategy from an emphasis 
on protecting Colombia's borders from external threats to combating internal threats. The 
isolation from domestic social and political problems that professional training had nurtured 
in military personnel, and which Gomez tried to recreate by enlisting the Armed Forces in 
the anti-Communist Korean War, ended with the prolonged guerrilla activity beginning in 
1946. 105 
From 1953, the armed forces has committed itselfto end a violent Liberal-Conservative 
feud. This means that the armed forces of Colombia are committed to social and political 
goals before a commitment to any particular leader or commander. Initially, upon Rojas' 
assumption of power, the army tended to view guerrillas as participants in a violent partisan 
struggle in which the armed forces were neither antagonists nor protagonists, but instead 
were principal arbiters. 106 
The arbiter role of the Armed Forces was welcomed by most Colombian political groups 
except, of course, the zealot supporters of Gomez who wanted the army to continue as their 
military instrument for imposing political views. A scattering of others were skeptical of the 
103 Hartlyn, p.42. 
104 Maullin, p.60. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., p.61. 
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military forces' allegedi; nonpartisan involvement in domestic political affairs. Rojas took 
the important political step, through three presidential decrees, to rehabilitate a large number 
of the combatants by offering amnesties and pardons. The second of these decrees, No.2184 
(August 1953), reinstated military officers who had been retired from the service because of 
the involvement in an attempted coup against President Alfonso Lopez in 1944. The other 
two decrees, No.l546 (June 1953) and 1823 (June 1954), focused primarily on the civilians 
engaged in political violence. These decrees set up procedures and time limits under which 
guerrillas could apply for amnesty for several categories of crimes committed in the liberal-
conservative warfare. 107 
While the military was shifting from a war to a truce with the guerrillas, the Rojas 
government established social agencies to aid the reintegration of guerrillas into normal 
social and economic activities.108 On the political front, besides seeking and winning the tacit 
endorsement of many liberal and conservative leaders, Rojas invited liberals into the 
Constituent Assembly left over from Gomez's regime. 109 Thus, both the military and civilian 
institutions made attempts to restore peace between liberals and conservatives. 
As Rojas' regime moved through the 1954-1958 presidential term, the Armed Forces 
continued to fulfill a pivotal role in national politics. Rojas' "Government of the Armed 
Forces" had originally trusted the military to occupy a neutral position between the 
predominantly liberal guerrillas and the conservative forces that had been removed from 
power. The army continued in combat against some guerrillas, but its goal was to establish 
public order and avoid being a "de facto" armed partisan force, as was the tendency under 
the Gomez government. But as conflict deepened between Rojas and the leadership of both 
parties, the military found itself protecting not only public order but also the fortunes of a 
partisan regime. In the field, support for the regime and maintenance of public order tended 
to merge. But in fact the Armed Forces had to define their guerrilla enemy in the emerging 
107 Ibid. 
108 Guzman, Vol1, p.l02. 
109 Jorge Villaveces, La Derrota, Bogota: Editorial Jorvi, 1963, pp.57-72. 
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context of the national political battle between Rojas and the national elites of both the 
Liberal and Conservative parties. 110 
According to Hartlyn, the evolution of "la violencia" provided both motivation and 
justification for leaders across both parties to seek accommodation anew. Both the inability 
of the Rojas government to bring violence to an end and the fact that some groups of 
insurgents were taking a more radical revolutionary purpose helped generate opposition to 
Rojas among important civilian sectors and support for restoration of civilian government. 111 
As a result of this, on May 10, 1957 the Rojas government was in a crisis due to the actions 
of the Civil Front composed of the civilian elites including members of the political 
parties. 112 
The major groups Rojas courted included the military and the church, as well as 
government employees, labor and urban marginal groups. He failed to gain substantial 
institutional or mass support in any of them, even as he alienated nearly all producer groups. 
The weakness of Rojas effort to build a new political movement reflected the most important 
constant in Colombia's political life: the continued centrality of the traditional parties. 113 The 
key factor operating against Rojas was the fact that the two traditional parties completely 
dominated the country's politicallandscape.114 To avoid serious violence and due to the great 
pressure, the President decided to abandon power. Rojas was replaced by a military junta 
composed of four generals and one admiral and flew into exile. Despite the origin of the 
110 Maullin, p.63. 
111 Hartlyn, p.47. 
112 The creation of the National Front was initially organized as an anti-military governing 
alternative, as its original name "Civil Front" (Frente Civil) intimated. The Civil Front 
became the National Front. Cited in Hartlyn, p.83. 
113 Ibid, p.48. 
114 Hartlyn, p.73. 
58 
nomination, 115 this junta was welcomed by the people, and led the country for a year through 
the transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. 
2. The National Front 
The only way to displaced General Rojas from power, block a potential if still weak 
revolutionary threat and end interparty violence was by forcing a consociational political 
alternative that provided for extensive interparty guarantees and generated strong societal 
support. 116 With the end of the era of dictatorship, and the end of the provisional Government 
of the Military "Junta," the transition to democracy and the movement towards bipartisan 
rule began. The bipartisan National Front was a radical and unusual innovation for the 
Colombian political system. This system was created to solve the country's problems and 
neutralize the political parties that were unable to lead the country. The National Front was 
to establish peace, democracy, and government institutions, justice and legitimacy for 
Colombia. 117 
As it finally emerged, the parties' National Front agreement sharply limited the operation 
mechanisms of majoritarian representative in the country. It stipulated that from 1958 to 
197 4 the presidency would alternate between members of the two parties, and that all cabinet 
officers, legislative and judicial posts and other government jobs not covered by civil service 
were to be divided equally between the two parties. From 1978 on, the majority party has 
been required to offer "adequate and equitable" representation in the executive branch to the 
party receiving the second highest number of votes in the elections. 118 The effort was 
designed to avoid a struggle for power and the main reward for the parties was control of the 
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy at that time became the primary source of employment for the 
115 Rojas apparently had the major role in determining the junta though senior military 
officers had some influence. Rojas expected the junta, which had several members 
who had deep loyal to him, would soon invite him to return. Cited in Hartlyn, p.59. 
116 Hartlyn, p.54. 
117 John D. Martz, Colombia A Contemporary Political Survey, Durham, NC: The 
University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1962, pp. 228-245. 
118 Hartlyn, p.4. 
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parties. This bipartisan rule began with Alberto Lleras Camargo in 1958, the future of the 
republic depended in large part upon his guidance and wisdom. 119• 
However, none of the reasons for the party power struggles were solved; instead, their 
feuding increased in ferocity. Individual leaders battled on both sides of the political fence 
to solidify their strength. They were motivated by the opportunism founded on desire for 
personal ascendancy. Political leaders pursued a labyrinthine web of shifting alliances and 
revised policy positions. The governance of the nation was left in the hands of the President. 
The National Front brought about changes that affected the course of Colombian history, 
especially in the following areas: 
• The struggle for power was not between parties. It was between sectors, especially 
civilian elites. 
• The erosion of ideological consensus. 
• Ideology was changed to other concepts such as: populism, patronage, and 
sectarianism. 
• The population was not taken into account democratically in any decision. 
• There was less participation and less representation at every level of government. 
• There was an increase in discontent and therefore an increase in the numbers of 
guerrillas and turmoil. 
• There was an absence of legitimacy within government. 
3. The Post-National Front Period 
Since the establishment of civilian rule in 1958, Colombia has achieved modest progress 
in reducing social inequality while maintaining a comparatively enviable record of stable 
growth. At the same time, the regime has generally maintained limited democratic rights and, 
until the 1980s, moderate patterns of socio-political strife. Its occasional use of repressive 
policies, though condemnable, have not compared to the brutal excesses of the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile or Uruguay .120 
119 Martz, p.273. 
120 Hartlyn, p.1. 
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The Liberal Party (LP) and the Conservative Party (CP) were weak, divided into factions, 
and inadequately organized at the end of the period of the National Front in 1974. Because 
the political parties were not eager to engage an intense competition for power, Colombia 
achieved a peaceful transition to an open democratic system. The principle of power sharing 
was retained, although the President was allowed to select appointees from whatever sources 
he chose if the opposition refused to participate in his government. 
The experience of the National Front, the lack of organizational efforts by the parties, and 
massive migrations of this period from rural to urban areas weakened party affiliations. This 
also decreased the likelihood of inter-party violence. The period after the National Front 
(197 4-1996) also reflected a growing gap between the issues and agendas of the political elite 
and the demands, concerns, and expectations of the populace. Political apathy and cynicism 
among the people increased. Thus, Colombia experienced a radicalization of peasant 
movements, an increase in urban protests, a growing restlessness within the urban labor 
movement, and a surge in rural and urban guerrilla activity. 121 
Popular discontent with the government's management of the economy continued despite 
steady economic growth and high primary export revenues. The massive underground 
economy, fueled by drug trafficking, undermined the government's efforts to control 
inflation, and contributed to the rise of a parallel financial market. These factors placed a 
large part of the national economy beyond the control oflegitimate authority. 122 The National 
Front was intended to bring political stability and legitimacy to the country. But even though 
the results were contrary, it had created the conditions that enabled the process of 
democratization to go forward. 
An important consideration is that an elite settlement was the type of negotiation that 
allowed the National Front to exist. However, according to Burton, Gunther and Higley: 
121 Roman Juan, "Guerrilla Violence in Colombia: Examining Causes and 
Consequences," Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June, 1994, p.28. 
122 Colombia: a Country Study, p.141. 
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. . . elite settlements stabilized political environments and regulated conflicts 
between rival elites, but they did not produce full-blown democratic regimes in 
any immediate way .123 
The National Front was the way Colombian elites selected to guide the country through 
the transition period. This experience produced some results, but finally produced a negative 
impact upon democratic consolidation in Colombia. With this history in mind one can 
conclude that, the National Front was the worst alternative to lead the country towards the 
consolidation of democracy. Because the National Front process did not allow the formation 
of new political ideologies, nor did it increase the level of political participation. It only 
strengthened the bureaucratic corruption of the old parties. Without new ideas and under the 
influence of patronage it was impossible to lead the country towards democratic 
consolidation. 
B. COLOMBIAN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN DANGER 
1. Is Colombia a Consolidating Democracy? 
Before trying to establish whether Colombia is a democracy or not, it is important to 
establish a good definition of democracy. According to Joseph Shumpeter, democracy: 
... is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which the 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people's vote. 124 
123 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Introduction: Elites 
Transformations and Democratic Regimes." Cited in John Higley and Richard 
Gunther, eds, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern 
Europe, 1992,p.20. 
124 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 2d. ed, New York: 
Harper, 1947, p. 269. Cited in Huntington, The Third Wave, p.6. 
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With this definition in mind, an approach for this study of Colombian democracy can be 
addressed. After the end of the military government a democratization process started in 
Colombia. 125 This process divides into two specific phases that evolved in a sequence. One 
is the "transition." In Colombia the transition was experienced under the National Front. 126 
The other process started after this National Front experiment ended in 1974, and was the 
process of "consolidation."127 
It is important to clarify that according to Richard Gunther, Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, and 
Nikiforos Diamandouros: 
Transition and consolidation are conceptually distinct aspects of democratization, 
although in practice they may temporally overlap or sometimes even coincide. 
Transition begins with the breakdown of the former authoritarian regime and 
ends with the establishment of a relatively stable configuration of political 
institutions within a democratic regime. The consolidation of democracy requires 
more time than the transition process. Consolidation is much more complex. 128 
125 Democratization, is the replacement of a government that was not chosen this way by 
one that selected in a free, open, and fair election. Huntington, Third Wave, p.9. 
126 The study of this transitions is called by Professor Huntington "Waves of 
democratization."A group of transitions from nondemocratic regimes that occur within 
a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite 
direction during that period oftime. Cited in Huntington, Third Wave, p.15. 
127 Consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly 
legitimate and so habitually practiced and observed that it is very unlikely to break 
down. Cited in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, Politics in 
Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder, Colorado, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 1995, p.53. 
128 Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jiirgen Puhle, The Politics of 
Democratic Consolidation, Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.3. 
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The process of democratization does not have specific periods for each phase; every 
country must be studied as an individual case. In Colombia the whole process of 
democratization has taken very long. First, the transition phase that in reality moved the 
country out of the military regime took 16 years and undermined any real progress toward 
competitive elections between parties. Historically, Colombia was part of the second wave 
of democratization where political and military factors were clearly predominant. 129 
Second, the process of consolidation started in-1974 with competitive elections between 
parties. This period was the most violent and turbulent in the recent Colombian history. 
During this period political violence has been the main threat to the Colombian state. 
Instability factors like guerrillas, narco-trafficking and corruption have been a permanent 
part of daily life in Colombia. Today, because of these problems Colombia has not been able 
to consolidate its democracy. For this reason Colombia can be classified as semi-democratic. 
According to Diamond, semi-democracies are: 
... those countries in which the effective power of elected officials is also limited 
or political party competition so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of 
elections so comprised that electoral outcomes, although competitive, do not 
produce true popular sovereignty and accountability, or in which civil and 
political liberties are so uncertain that some political orientations and interest are 
unable to organize and express themselves peacefully, without fear. 130 
Many labels are used by political scientists in this approach to study non-consolidated 
democracies like Colombia. Among them, "low-quality democracy,"" low-intensity 
democracy,"" poor democracy," and "delegative democracy," are other terms that have been 
used primarily in the Latin American context to describe a system that may have fair, 
competitive, and open elections; authentic power for elected officials; freedom of expression 
and of press; and at least some independent organizations and media, but nevertheless lacks 
129 Huntington, p.40. 
130 Diamond, Linz and Lipset, pp.7-8. 
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accountability, responsiveness, and institutional balance and effectiveness between 
elections. 131 
In Colombia it was thought that democracy was directly related to elections. Some even 
consider the mere fact of elections as a sufficient condition for the existence of democracy. 
However, for others this fallacy has been called "electoralism." In the words of Philippe C. 
Schmitter and Terry Karl, electoralism is: 
... the faith that merely holding elections will channel political action into a 
peaceful contest among elites and accord public legitimacy to the winners. 132 
This study uses as a tool the definition given by Adam Przeworski for what really is a 
consolidated democracy, to determine whether it can be applied to Colombia. He states that 
a democracy is consolidated: 
... when under given political and economic conditions a particular system of 
institutions becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting 
outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again 
within the same institutions under which they have just lost. 133 
With this in mind, it can be argued that Colombia as a state had been unable to impose 
the rule of law over leftist guerrillas as well as over the powerful drug cartels. In Colombia, 
because of corruption, the people often look for resolution to their problems outside of the 
legal institutions. For that reason, violence, narco-trafficking and disorder are an important 
131 Ibid., p.8. 
132 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Karl, "What Democracy is .... and is Not," In Larry 
Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds, The Global Resurgence of Democracy, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University, 1993, p.42. 
133 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economical Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 
26. Cited in Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, The Politics of Democratic 
Consolidation, Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, p.7. 
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parts of Colombian democratic equation. For this reason it can be said that, after 16 year 
of transition, and a 26 year process of consolidation, Colombia has not been able to fully 
consolidate its democracy. 
2. The Problems that Colombian Democracy Faces 
Colombia faces multiple problems that endanger its journey down -the democratic path 
and at times threaten Colombia's existence. Among these problems, the first three are 
identified as major internal problems, most of them related to violence: 
• Marxist-nationalist guerrillas; 
• the cocaine drug cartels; 
• generalized corruption. 
Other problems are external problems. Colombia is experiencing problems with its major 
commercial partner, the United States, primarily because of drug production. These problems 
together have placed Colombia within the category of countries that face major threats to 
democracy. All of these problems can be condensed in one term: instability. 
Stability today is the most important factor that will permit the consolidation of 
democracy in Colombia. On one side, a stable regime as defined by Przeworski: 
... is one whose institutionalization and level and breadth of popular legitimacy 
make it highly likely to persist, even in the face of crises and challenges. 
On the other side, a partially stable regime is: 
... neither fully secure nor in imminent danger of collapse. Their institutions have 
perhaps acquired some measure of depth, flexibility, and value but not enough 
to ensure them safe passage through severe challenges. 134 
134 Ibid., p.9. 
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With these definitions, Colombia can be classified, contrary to the beliefs of its own 
population, as a "partially stable regime." Just because there is an electoral process or 
Colombia is not going through a coup d'etat, does not make the regime stable and democracy 
consolidated. Colombia experiences a high degree of instability that may not enable the 
country to find its way towards democratic consolidation. 
Theories of democracy stress that democratic stability requires a widespread belief 
among elites and masses in the legitimacy of the democratic system and that it is the best (or 
the "least evil") form of government. In the words of Juan Linz: 
... that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are 
better than any others that might be established, and hence that the democratic 
regime is morally entitled to demand obedience -to tax and draft, to make laws 
and enforce them, even, if necessary, by the use offorce. 135 
These threats to Colombian democracy have not been confronted by a strong state. On 
the contrary, the lack of strong laws and legitimacy caused by corruption have placed the 
state in a situation of defenselessness. Colombia's democracy has followed a poor trajectory 
in its efforts to avoid these dangers. Because the state is weak, people sometimes think that 
they have not received the guarantees that a democracy should provide. Using Samuel 
Huntington's words: 
The most important political distinction among countries concerns is not their 
form of government but their degree of government. 136 
135 Juan Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and 
Reequilibration, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 5. Cited in 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset, Politics in Developing Countries, Comparing Experiences 
with Democracy, p.9. 
136 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1968, p. 1. Cited in Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 28. 
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It can be said that during the last four decades of democratic governance in Colombia, 
leaders were unable to take the necessary steps to solve the social differences between classes 
or reduce the levels of violence and corruption. This has undermined the consolidation of 
democracy. In other words, these governments have not been able to lead the country safely 
throughout this long and complicated process of consolidation. 
Colombia must establish its own priorities and decide which -problems must be 
confronted with the power of the state. A dispersed effort has not shown results in the past. 
This application of strategies and efforts is called "unity of effort" within the military. 
Today, it is more clear than ever that a unity of effort must be oriented to the drug problem. 
3. It is Possible for Colombia to Start the Third Reverse Wave of 
Democratization? 
In his book, The Third Wave, Samuel Huntington argues that three major waves of 
democratization have occurred in the modern world."137 He called a wave of democratization 
a group of transitions from nondemocratic regimes that occur within a specified period of 
time and that significantly outnumber transitions in opposite direction during that period of 
time. 138 
He identifies the two earliest waves of democratization: a long, slow wave from 1828 to 
1926 and a second wave from 1943 to 1964. Significantly: 
... each of the first two waves of democratization was followed by a "reverse 
wave" in which some but not all of the countries that had previously made the 
transition to democracy reverted to nondemocratic rule. The first lasting from 
1922 to 1942, the second from 1961 to 1975, in which some of the newly 
established or reestablished democracies failed. 139 
137 Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 15. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?," Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 3, July 
1996, p.20. 
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However, it is also true, that recent years have witnessed a significant erosion of 
democracy throughout much of Latin America. 140 This so-called erosion, however, has not 
reached the patterns in the past when the region was known world wide for its military 
regimes and "snowballing" coups d'etat. Unfortunately, the consolidation processes in 
different countries is complicated, especially in a world where economic performance is 
important to the success of a government. 
Colombia is not far from this erosion or "institutional decay." For that reason, according 
to Diamond: 
It is a dangerous fallacy to view consolidation as a one-time, irreversible process. 
Democracies come and go. Over time, they may become legitimated, 
institutionalized, and consolidated. But as their institutions decay and democratic 
beliefs and practices erode, they may also become de-consolidated. 141 
Many anti-democratic proposals have taken place since de-certification. These proposals 
did not come from the military institutions. On the contrary, they came from a very 
frightened civil society and range from the possibility of a general strike, to a civil-led coup 
d'etat, from a fujimorazo 142 to a war cabinet. These types of proposals are supposed to be in 
the past and out of the modem political dictionary of Colombians, but today they are a clear 
and present danger in the Colombian society. On August 13, 1996 the U.S. Ambassador in 
Bogota, Myles Frechette, made an announcement on Colombian television (Noticiero 24 
Horas) that shocked the population: 
140 Diamond, Linz and Lipset, p.3. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Expression which characterized an institutional coup d'etat produced by the ruling 
President of Peru Alberto Fujimori. On AprilS, 1992, Fujimori suspended the 
constitution, dissolved Congress, and took control of the government in a move aimed 
at rooting out corruption in political institutions and strengthening his hand in the war 
against terrorist. This action is also known as "auto-golpe." Cited in "Peru History," 
Control Risks Information Services Reports, Via Internet, IDC, USA, July 1, 1996. 
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... a group of civilians had approached him to test the potential United States 
reaction to a coup. 143 
Today, the probability that Colombia could start a reverse wave of democratization in 
Latin America is more likely than at any time in the last forty years. Some of the causes that 
may favor a reverse wave of democratization are: 
• The vacuum of power that is perceived by most of the population, especially 
because President Samper has to spend more time defending himself than 
governing the nation. 
• The populist discourse that President Samper has used to respond to U.S. 
intervention is creating a dangerous line dividing classes. This attitude is 
exacerbating the conflict between rich and poor, between owners and workers. 
The danger of this situation is that in Colombia the easiest way to resolve conflicts 
is through violence. This could be the basis for a civil war. 
• The probability of economic sanctions will have an immediate effect upon the 
behavior of all sectors of commerce and production. This in fact could create a 
situation of mass disobedience that can be use by guerrillas to achieve the last 
stage of revolution, "general insurrection." 
• The military is caught in the middle of the conflict, supporting democracy under 
the most extreme conditions: 
• First, under the guerrilla military pressure. The military is shown as a 
weak institution, unable to defend the national security of the country. 
• Second, the military is under the permanent pressure and investigation of 
the General Attorney Office, human rights organizations, and the liberal 
media, many times with the obscure intervention of guerrillas in support 
of this legal war against military institutions. 144 
• Third, the military is under U.S. pressure to become more involved in the 
drug war than in the anti-guerrilla war. Sometimes, the rejection of the 
143 Diana Jean Schemo, "Oil Companies Buy an Army to Tame Colombia's Rebels," The 
New York Times, New York, August 22, 1996, p. A8. 
144 Expression used in Colombia, which involves a new combination of guerrilla warfare. 
The objective is to accuse military leaders at all levels ofthe chain of command for 
crimes against human rights. This accusations are placed at different national and 
international judicial institutions as well as non governmental institutions NGOs, in 
order to achieve the military's prosecution and if possible encarcelation. 
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military leadership to be involved in the drug war has been categorized by 
the U.S. as corruption. 
• Fourth, the military is criticized by the populace. Especially when the 
military has to control or disperse masses in revolt by using force. 
• Fifth, the military must fight and offer up their lives for corrupt 
democratic institutions that are more oriented to personal interest than the 
interests of the people. 
• Sixth the military is under the pressure of some members of civilian elites 
and economic groups for a coup d'etat to solve the internal conflict, 
protecting in this way their personal interests. 
4. Would a Democratic or a Military Regime Solve the Drug Problem? 
The drug problem is today a major threat to the national security of various countries. 
Everything that is involved with narco-trafficking threatens the sovereignty of countries and 
the lives of citizens. Arms, chemicals, and drugs trafficking as well as money laundering 
are de-stabilizing democracies around the world. This is especially true in those democracies 
that have not yet consolidated. When narco-traffickers see a weak state, and weak 
institutions, they find the best possible base for their business. 
The drug-trafficking problem cannot be solved by one country or one specific type of 
regime or institution. Narco-trafficking is today an international and illegal business that 
must be treated with international strategies, laws and unity of effort. It can be argued that 
today the economic capability of narco-trafficking is so great, that it will not matter which 
type of regime is fighting the traffic. Democracies as well as military regimes can be equally 
affected by the threat of the corruption. If a country is to be successful in this war, what really 
matters is the irrevocable political decision to fight with all its resources and the international 
support necessary to destroy this scourge. 
However, according to Diamond, Linz and Lipset: 
... corruption is likely to be more visible [in a democracy] than is the case under 
authoritarianism." 145 
145 Diamond, Linz and Lipset, p.ll. 
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Such widespread corruption also undermines economic development and is one of the major 
arguments used by the military to justify overthrowing of elected governments, even though 
the corruption will likely be as great or greater under a military regime. 146 
Even so according to Diamond: 
Democracies have their peculiar vulnerabilities. One of these is the-particularly 
corrosive effect of corruption on the legitimacy of democratic regimes, even more 
than on authoritarian ones. 147 
However, I will argue that a country must try to find solutions through its democratic 
institutions. If the democratic path is followed and the necessary reforms are reached, a light 
at the end of the dark tunnel of narco-trafficking can be seen. In the words of Schmitter and 
Karl: 
Unlike authoritarian regimes, democracies have the capacity to modify their rules 
and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances. 148 
After considering this new perspective on democracy and the drug war, either under the 
control of a military or a democratic regime and looking at problems from only a national 
interest level, I would argue that the only thing that could create greater instability in the 
Colombian government is a military regime. An authoritarian type of regime without 
legitimacy and minimum public support could not effectively pursue the war against narco-
guerrillas. To achieve military objectives the military regime would have to deal with social 
inequality, the economy and a very strong opposition. These factors by themselves would use 
all resources and lead the regime to its own demise. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid., p.ll. 
148 Schmitter and Karl, p.51. 
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If a democracy is willing to pursue the drug war to its ultimate consequences it can be 
argued that this process cannot be accomplished without the full support of the military 
establishment. As stated by Diamond: 
The military are the ultimate support of regimes. If they withdraw their support, 
if they carry out a coup against the regime, or if they refuse to use force against 
those who threaten to overthrow the regime, the regime falls. 149 -
The military must be taken into account by the democratic government when the national 
strategies are set. This will involve the military in the process and will permit a clear 
understanding of the strategies. At the same time for the military it will be easier to 
accomplish the military's tactical objectives. This process will also avoid any type of rivalry 
between the military and the national police, a factor that may affect greatly the probability 
of success for government objectives and civil-military relations in general. 
In the specific case of the Colombian military it is very important to take into account 
some unique characteristics and differences from the traditional Latin American military 
institutions. This will enable an understanding of how difficult it is for the military of 
Colombia to become involved in politics. Among them are: 150 
• In Colombia there is no major tradition of military governments. Even the short 
period of military rule from 1953 to 1957 was marked by conflicts between the 
political parties, which left temporary military leadership as the only available 
option. 
• Since 1948, the armed forces, especially the army, have been immersed in the task 
of controlling public order. The demands of internal security situations occupy 
the majority of army units and activity and considerable portions of resources of 
the other military branches as well. 
• According to the Constitution the military must be apolitical. The politicians 
constantly invqke this characteristic, and deliberations or opinions of military 
leaders about internal issues are usually not permitted. This opinion can be 
summarized in a speech made by President Alberto Lleras Camargo in 1958: 
149 Diamond, Linz and Lipset, pp.144-145. 
150 Roman, p.54. 
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Politics are not going to enter the bodies of national defense; no pressure could 
lead me to oppose what I understand as the protection of peace and the warranty 
of good defense for the republic, which is the impartiality, and political neutrality 
of the armed forces. 151 
Even so, the military forces were involved on counter drug operations in the past. For 
example, military units were an important part of the component that captured and killed all 
the members of the Medellin cartel and recently imprisoned the leadership of the Cali 
cartel. 152 Today, this role is substantial through military operations like "conquest 
operation" (operacion conquista). These operations will permit the destruction of 67,000 
acres of coca plants during 1996 in the most important centers of production, the 
departments of Guaviare, Caqueta y Putumayo. This military effort is direct in support of the 
government campaign for crop eradication. 
The Colombian military posture is clear and there are other sources which identify it, like 
Control Risks Information Services reports, a consulting firm that provides its clients with 
analyses of the risks from political violence and instability. In an 18 month regime stability 
forecast for Colombia, Control Risks estimated that the probability of a military regime was 
15 percent. The stated reason is that: 
151 Alberto Lleras, Escritos Selectos, Bogota, Institute Colombiano de Cultura, 1976, p. 
136. 
152 During the war against the powerful Colombian cartels a new type of organization was 
created. This was called "Bloque de Busqueda" or searching block. This type of unit 
involved army, marines, air force, police, and Colombian judiciary, working as an elite 
team against the cartels. The author of this thesis, as a commander of the Colombian 
Army Special Forces Battalion, was personally involved in some ofthe operations of 
the searching block that destroyed the Medellin cartel. 
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... since the military tradition includes respect for the Constitution, its officers 
would intervene only if they perceived outright chaos or what they considered to 
be gross violation of the Constitution. 153 
Even though this forecast was given before the 1996 de-certification, it represents a clear 
understanding of the Colombian military posture and also the political realities of today. 
To conclude, on the one hand the democratic tradition of the Colombian military forces 
has played a key role in the process of democratization. Since 1957 the Colombian Military 
Forces have developed strong military culture in which there is a respect for the Constitution 
and democracy. Furthermore, the involvement of the military in multiple fronts of war 
against guerrillas, drug-trafficking, civil conflicts and border security have been a factor that 
keeps the military out of the political struggle. 
On the other hand, it is clear the war against narco-trafficking cannot be won either by 
a democracy or by a military regime. As long as narco-trafficking is not dealt with on the 
international level with an understanding that this problem is a two-sided problem, with 
production and consumption, the narco-trafficking war cannot be won. However, it is 
important to point out that for Colombia, winning is a matter of survival and the single goal 
of the state must be to end the drug cultivation, drug producing and drug trafficking. The war 
against drugs should be Colombia's center of gravity and the primary focus of the national 
interest, national strategy, defense budget, and military and police operations. If Colombia 
follows this path, democracy will be stronger, the guerrillas will lose their financial support 
and narco-trafficking will end at least in Colombia. Colombia must pursue these goals with 
or without the U.S. support. 
153 
"Colombian 18 Month Regime Stability Forecasts," Control Risks Information 
Services Reports, Via Internet, IDC, USA, December 1, 1995. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. POLICIES 
The implications of current U.S. policies toward Colombia are great, especially because 
of the great variety and high impact of these policies in all areas of power. In his book 
International Politics, A Framework/or Analysis, K.J. Holsti argues that 
The variety of foreign policy instruments available to a nation for influencing 
others is partly a function of the quantity and quality of capabilities. 154 
This chapter will demonstrate that in this bilateral process, the United States has used a 
variety of means to affect the behavior of Colombia, and to protect its national interest. This 
type of international political behavior is without any doubt a "power politics" approach, one 
that seeks to influence the behavior of the other states. 
A. MEANS AND ENDS 
According to Samuel Huntington, in the third wave of democratization the U.S. 
government uses a variety of means, political, diplomatic, economic, and military, to 
promote democratization.155 The need to control drug trafficking from Colombia is one of 
the most pressing narcotics and foreign policy challenges the United States faces. According 
to Ambassador Robert Gelbard: 
In the post-cold war era, you can hardly find a foreign policy issue that has such , 
an immediate and direct detrimental effect on so many Americans as the 
international drug trade. 156 
154 Holsti, p.121. 
155 Huntington, p. 93. 
156 Robert Gelbard, "International Narcotics Control Effort in the Western Hemisphere," 
Statement before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House of 
International Relations Committee, Washington D.C. March 29, 1995. Cited on U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch, Volume 6, Number 16, Bureau of Public Affairs, April 
17, 1995, p.340. 
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This so-called "war" has caused a political struggle between the Clinton and the Samper 
governments. The United States is eager to achieve better results in a war that is fought 
externally against production and internally against consumption. But this war has not been 
won yet. Colombia is the major producer of cocaine in the world. A country that has not 
been able to restore its legitimacy after the 1991 Constitution through a strong judiciary and 
with a very strong posture against drug-trafficking. Colombia has paid an enormous price in 
human life, but has not been able to win its part of the war against drug production. 
The final objective or what I called the drug war "end" for the United States is to win the 
war against narco-trafficking. Even so, the strategies to achieve this end are often not clear, 
and are affected by the continuous changes on the administration approaches. Sortie times 
without taking into consideration that this war is not a conventional one; is not fought in 
one place; even worse, the enemy sometimes is not clearly defined. This war is a low 
intensity type of conflict, a characteristic that makes the probabilities of success more 
difficult to achieve. However, to end drug production, trafficking, and consumption, the U.S. 
must use all the available means. These means are the tools that will permit the most rapid 
and efficient solution to the problem. These means can be used individually or combined. 
1. Political Means 
Within the political and diplomatic spectrum, the de-certification is an important tool for 
the United States to pressure what the U.S. State Department calls "source countries." De-
certification supports President Clinton's general counter narcotics strategy to shut down the 
drug cartel's operations by targeting their numerous interests, front companies, investments, 
and their use ofthe international banking system to launder illicit gains. 157 
Although the Clinton administration's political agenda on drugs seems clear, it is also 
true that the 1996 election year in the U.S. and pressures from the "Senator Jesse Helms' 
157 Ibid., p.94. 
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school of foreign policy,"158 has moved the President of the United States. to implement the 
U.S. political and diplomatic means against Colombia. Because of this, U.S. diplomacy, that 
is used primarily to reach agreements, compromises, and settlements where governments 
objectives conflict, have been used more to change policies, actions, objectives, and attitudes 
of other governments and their diplomats by persuasion, offering rewards, exchanging 
concessions, or making threats. 159 
Within the diplomatic arena, many steps were taken. Many meetings between top policy 
officials of Washington and Bogota were held. It was publicly acknowledged by the United 
States that the de-certification could cause economic hardship for Colombia. After the 
decision to deny Colombia a certification on March 1, 1996, more political and diplomatic 
actions were taken by the United States. One of these actions was the process by which the 
U.S. State Department declared ineligible for a U.S. visa the President of Colombia Ernesto 
Samper and other personalities. The State Department, argued that: 
... based on the information they have, the government of the United States has 
determined that the President of Colombia Ernesto Samper is ineligible to receive 
a U.S. visa under American law. 160 
This decision was based on the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 and the State 
Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956. According to these laws the United States State 
Department can negate or cancel visas to enter into the U.S. because of infractions or crimes 
related to drug affairs. 161 
158 
"Colombia's Failure," Miami Herald, Miami, March 6, 1996, Cited in Information 
Services on Latin America, Vol.51, Issue# 3, March 1996, p.222. 
159 Holsti, p. 144. 
160 
"No estamos satisfechos con Samper," El Tiempo, Via Internet, Bogota, July 12, 1996, 
pp.1-5. 
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Other important personalities of the country received the same sanction, including the 
Ambassador of Colombia in Mexico, Gustavo de Greiff; the General Attorney of the 
Country, Orlando Vasquez; and the General Comtroller, David Turbay. The impact of this 
action on the Colombian population was diverse. The effect was on the population rather 
than the Samper government, and created a strong anti-American reaction resulting in more 
popular support for the President. 
Samper's government gained support because of the "visa affair," especially within 
middle-low and lower classes. Civilian elites, the business community, the press, university 
students, and the middle and upper classes, perceived this decision as a very dangerous signal 
before the implementation of U.S. economic sanctions. Because of this, all the major 
newspapers of the country including El Tiempo, a bastion of Liberal press, called for the 
president's resignation. 162 Once more, U.S. actions were dividing Colombians. On one side, 
those who perceived any minor threat to their personal interest or business were against 
Samper. On the other side, especially among workers and peasants, the President gained 
momentary political support. 
2. Economic Means 
Economic sanctions have always been important means to achieve U.S. goals. Holsti, in 
"the instruments of policy: economic rewards and coercion" clearly explains this process. He 
argues that: 
Only a few states are endowed sufficiently with the full range of natural 
resources, foods, and energy to sustain modem or modernizing economic 
establishments. For others, trade, financial flows (foreign investment), and 
sometimes foreign aid are critical for survival and economic progress. 163 
Furthermore, he explains that: 
162 
"Fuertes Editoriales en Colombia," El Tiempo, Via Internet, Bogota, July 13, 1996, 
p.1-2. 
163 Holsti, p.177. 
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. . . because of the complexity of commercial transactions between societies, 
governments, in seeking to change or sustain behavior of others, have a broad 
range of instrumentalities. 164 
Between the most frequently techniques used are: tariffs, quotas, boycott, embargo, loans, 
credits, and currency manipulation, blacklists, licensing, freezing assets, granting or 
suspending aid, including military sales or grants, expropriation and finaily withholding dues 
to an international organization. Of course de-certification is part of this list. 
Even so, there is a perception that de-certification carries significant political punch but 
has a smaller economic impact. A recent study made by FEDESARROLLO, an influential 
economic research institute of Colombia, found the de-certification had been a key factor in 
declining profits, low investment and slow growth. The figure that raises the most concern 
was Fedesarrollo's forecast of a 3.8 percent increase in the gross domestic product for 1996, 
far lower than official projections of 4.9 percent, and even lower than the annual growth rates 
of more than 5 percent that Colombia has had in 1993, 1994, and 1995.165 
Also, President Clinton has not used his discretionary powers to disqualify Colombia 
from preferential tariffs, because this would close the U.S. market to imports of coffee, 
flowers, bananas and other legitimate goods. 166 The de-certification decision also does not 
cut off anti-drug cooperation between the two governments. However, the law does require 
the United States to vote against Colombian loan requests from a half dozen lending 
164 Ibid, p.179. 
165 Pamela Mercer, "Economy of Colombia Unsettled by Crisis," The New York Times, 
New York, May 5, 1996. Cited by Information Services on Latin America, Vol.51, 
Issue# 5, May 1996, p.18. 
166 Christopher S. Wren, "Clinton Declares That Colombia Has Failed to Curb Drug 
Trade, The New York Times, New York, March 2, 1996. Cited by Information Services 
on Latin America, Vol.51, Issue# 3, March 1996, p.206. 
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institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, The Inter-American Developing 
Bank, and the World Bank. 167 
Even though the U.S. government has not implemented economic sanctions, it is very 
important to keep in mind that the Clinton administration possesses more options within its 
legal arsenal. One of the most important weapons the administration may use if it does not 
see any progress in the Colombian actions against narco-trafficking or if they do not see an 
impact from the de-certification is the use of the International Economic Powers Act 
(IEEP A). This act gives special powers to the President of the United States to declare a 
situation of international emergency. Because of this, properties and accounts of Colombia 
can be confiscated in the United States. 168 According to experts from the firm of Manatt, 
Phelps and Phillips, the Clinton administration already has given orders to study the 
probability of using IEEP A against Colombia. This policy has been used in the past against 
countries such: Iran, Iraq, Cuba and North Korea. 169 
3. Military and Law Enforcement Means 
American use of force abroad to protect commercial interest, maintain "law and order," 
and prevent imoads by "international communism" has occurred frequently since the 
declaration of the Momoe Doctrine in 1823. One study lists more than 1 00 American 
military interventions in Latin America between 1806 and 1933. 170 This, of course, does not 
count the many times that the U.S. Government has intervened in Latin America since 1933. 
167 Douglas Farah, "U.S. Deepens Bogota Leader's Crisis, Decertification Carries 
Political Punch But Lesser Economic Impact, The Washington Post, Washington, 
March 2, 1996, Cited by Information Services on Latin America, Vol.51, Issue# 3, 
March 1996, p.205. 
168 
"E.U. Puede Castigar Mas a Colombia," El Tiempo, Via Internet, Bogota, July 27, 
1996,p.l. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Knopf, "Intervention in Latin America," C. Neale Ronning, ed., New York, 1970, 
p.25. Cited in Holsti, p.220. 
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The U.S. government possesses a series of military and law enforcement means to support 
its political decisions. According to Holsti: 
The most important aspect of a nuclear capability (or any military capability) is 
not in possession, but its relevance and the ability to signal one's determination 
to use it. 171 
Even though in the recent past the United States has invaded Grenada and Panama, it can 
be argued that an action of such a nature against Colombia is not on the U.S. political or 
military agenda. However, the fear of the these kinds of actions even though the probability 
of their recurrence is very low or non existent, is real. Such threat perception produces the 
required deterrence that the United States needs to protect its national interest and national 
security. 
The author argues that the U.S. military involvement in the drug war in Colombia has 
been more cooperative than non-cooperative. This support has been oriented to military 
logistics and training, but especially directed to the national police. The U.S. military means 
have been present with navy patrols of the Caribbean waters, the implementation of 
electronic intelligence, the use of radars strategically situated to intercept drug-trafficking 
aircrafts and the employment of special electronic intelligence that have been the key to 
detect the movements of the leaders of the Medellin and Cali cartels prior to their capture 
or deaths. All these actions, of course, were friendly actions, welcome by the Colombian 
government. 
But although the United States has used military means to conduct friendly actions in 
favor of Colombia, there also have been other actions that have been less consensual. For 
example: 
• The constant presence of U.S. Navy ships inside Colombian waters, as well as 
U.S. Air Force planes inside Colombian air space without authorization. 
• The development of a training exercise in the Colombian-Panamanian border 
between U.S. forces and Panamanian forces. 
171 Holsti, p.l22. 
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• The visits of members of the U.S. Southern Command to Venezuela to discuss 
national security issues. 
• The suspension of all Colombian Army, Navy and Air Force aid in all areas. 
• The general sense that the non-involvement of the Colombian military in the drug 
war was because of perceived corruption, and not because they were involved in 
a war against communist guerrillas. A war that contrary to the narco-traffickers 
objectives wanted to change the regime through revolution. 
These actions probably are not intended to threaten Colombian sovereignty. But, today 
with the great involvement of the media in all these matters, the implications of actions like 
these are huge. As a result a sense of distrust exists within the political and civil society of 
Colombia against any U.S. military involvement in or near the country . This is contrary to 
the sense of cooperation that exists within some institutions like the national police. 
At the same time these military actions are taking place, the United States uses many 
civilian agencies to fight against drug-trafficking. Probably the two most important law 
enforcement tools the United States has are the Drug Enforcement Administration, known 
as DEA and the United States Customs. These two agencies are not in very high standing in 
Colombian public opinion. These agencies, while fighting against drug-trafficking have 
many times undermined individual rights of Colombians. On the other hand, there is also a 
positive impact of the actions of these law enforcement agencies, not just by providing the 
adequate deterrence for narco-traffickers, but also by involving Colombian export companies 
and security agencies in providing their own security to detect any illegal action before 
reaching the United States. 
4. Unintended Consequences 
The United States has a variety of political, diplomatic, economic, military and law 
enforcement means to achieve its goals. However, the power and implications of the U.S. 
government actions are so great that the danger of "unintended consequences" is always 
present. The probability is that all the bureaucracies involved in the drug war and the 
process of de-certification will not evaluate carefully the impact that this type of political, 
economic and moral sanction may have on Colombian democracy. Unfortunately, de-
certification has a major impact especially on those institutions that are working in support 
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of the drug war, and on the thousands of honest business people who are willing to 
demonstrate that there are other ways to make a profit rather than being a drug lord. 
The study of this complicated topic has led the author to conclude that the de-
certification process carries more of a political and moral punch to Samper's administration, 
rather than a punch to the cocaine cartels. The political objective, to force Samper from the 
presidency, cannot be accomplished according to most of the experts writing on this topic, 
and Samper will probably complete his mandate in August 1998. However, one of the 
unintended consequences of de-certification is the undermining of the democratic process 
in Colombia. It is because of this unstable situation that some of the presidential candidates 
for 1998 suggest non-democratic solutions. For example, Juan Manuel Santos (former 
Minister of Commerce), suggested in late 1996, that the only solution to Colombia's 
problems was a "Fujimorazo" (a Peruvian-stale coup). Rafael Pardo (former Minister of 
Defence) proposed a war cabinet to resolve the situation. 172 
B. DEMOCRACY, BEFORE AND AFTER THE DE-CERTIFICATION 
According to Robert Dahl, the chance that a country will be governed at the national level 
by a regime in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the population, 
depends on at least seven sets of complex conditions. 173 This study will use these seven 
characteristics of democracy to test whether the Colombian pattern of democracy before and 
after the de-certification has changed. The intention is to find out whether this U.S. action 
will strengthen the Colombian democracy, or whether the de-certification will weaken 
democracy. 
1. Explaining Variable (1): Access to Violence 
In the case of Colombia one of the most important factors conditioning democracy is the 
socioeconomic order. Without a doubt, the access to violence (1) in Colombia has been a 
common feature in the life of the country. Violence dominates daily life in Colombia. Indeed, 
172 
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by any measure of nations not at war, Colombia is one of the most violent countries on 
earth.174 With a table of comparative crimes between 1990 and 1995, an understanding of the 
huge impact that violence has had on the Colombian society can be gained. 
a e . o ert a s on Itlons T bl 2 R b D hi' C d' . F avormg D emocracy 
(+)Impact (-)Impact (+)Impact (-)Impact 
De-certification Before After 
I. Historical Sequences NA NA -NA NA. 
II. Socio economic Order 
A.Access to: 
!.Violence )( )((I) 
2.Socio economic Sanctions )( )( 
B.Type of Economy 
!.Agrarian )( )( 
2.Commercial-industrial 
III. Level Socioeconomic Development )( )((2) 
IV. Equalities and Inequalities 
A. Objective )( )( 
B.Subjective )( )( 
v. SubculturalPluralism 
A. Amount NA NA NA NA. 
B.lf Marked or High NA NA NA NA. 
VI. Domination by a Foreign Country )( )( 
VII. Beliefs of Political Activist: 
A.lnstitutions ofPolyarchy are )( )((3) 
Legitimate 
B. Only Unilateral Authority is NA NA NA NA. 
Legitimate 
C.Polyarchy is Effective in Solving )( )((4) 
Major 
Problems 
D. Trust in Others )( )( 
E.Political Relationships are: 
!.Strictly Competitive )( )( 
2.Strictly Cooperative )( )( 
3. Cooperative-Competitive NA NA NA NA. 
F.Compromise Necessary and Desirable )( )( 
NA: Non applicable. 
Source Robert A Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition, p.203. 
174 Riley, p.l. 
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This violence is the product of continuous instability, and also explains the great influence 
of guerrillas and narco-trafficking on the national life. 
Table 3. Crimes Between 1990 and 1995 
No. Type of Crime 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Var. 
1 Against the State Existence, Security 2 5 2 18 16 I -94,44 
2 Against Constitutional Regime 125 125 150 199 174 96 -51,76 
3 Against Public Administration 673 807 816 575 723 725 26,09 
4 Against Justice Administration 575 458 375 349 387 521 49,28 
5 Against Public Security 11992 14234 15603 18157 19036 21411 17,92 
6 Against Public Faith 962 1154 1037 841 940 1022 21,52 
7 Against Economic, Social Order 1594 1294 1278 1109 1181 1057 -4,69 
8 Against Suffrage 152 78 104 3 395 5 66,67 
9 Against Family 751 897 794 906 1223 1600 76,60 
10 Against Individual Liberties 3918 5570 3497 4688 5234 6150 31,19 
11 Against Sexual Liberty 1883 2091 2 1841 2355 2190 18,96 
12 Aoainst Moral Integrity 772 1034 969 923 893 1059 14,73 
13 Against Life and Personal Integrity 86153 89828 92547 80977 85190 82068 1,35 
14 Against Private Property 96640 103634 104168 78208 94270 105196 34,51 
Total Number Crimes 206192 221209 221342 188794 212017 223101 1817 
Note: Statistics taken from the book Criminalidad 1995, Policia Nacional de Colombia, Bogota, No.38, p. 67. 
Even though the levels of violence had been high before the de-certification, today the 
impact ofthis violence is greater because after the de-certification and the "8,000 process," 
the Colombian leftist guerrillas, have adopted a more radical position. The leftist guerrillas 
from the F ARC, and ELN, 175 the two major guerrilla groups of Colombia, have used to their 
advantage the political instability caused by the famous narco-scandal. The groups have used 
this excuse to support a revolutionary discourse against political corruption and the 
democratic institutions. 
The lack oflegitimacy ofSamper's government has not permitted a strong and planned 
response from the state to face the guerrilla threat. In part the government has lost its 
flexibility because it has to spend a lot of energy trying to defend itself from corruption 
charges in the midst of this political and diplomatic storm. Also, there has been a lack of 
175 The second guerrilla group of Colombia, led by Manuel Perez, Spanish priest. This 
group has been historically a pro-Cuban movement. Today, it is responsible for most 
of the terrorist acts against petroleum installations, as well as multiple kidnappings and 
killings. 
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compromise between political parties, and a failure to adopt strong measures against the 
factors of violence with the necessary legislative and budgetary support for the security 
forces. 
The F ARC especially has planned important acts of aggression against the military and 
national police. Before the de-certification, their actions resulted in the killing of two or 
three soldiers or policemen. After the de-certification, guerrillas responded with bigger and 
carefully planned operations in which massive killings were produced, such in the case of 
Puerres in the Nariiio Department, where 31 soldiers were killed and 15 were wounded in 
one ambush on April 16, 1996,176 or the case of Las Delicias in the Putumayo Department, 
where 50 soldiers were killed and 60 more captured in raids against a military patrol base on 
August 30, 1996.177 These actions and hundreds of others have been brought back from the 
jungles on to the television screens and newspapers of Colombia, a bitter demonstration of 
the crude reality of the narco-guerrilla violence. These terrible actions are giving the country 
an impressive message: Today the Colombian government cannot defeat militarily the 
guerrilla groups. 
Recently narco-guerrillas have been the focus of the military and police actions. With 
these operations an intense eradication campaign has begun. This situation is the result of 
actions where the Colombian authorities try to prove, especially to the United States, that this 
link between narco-traffickers and guerrillas exists, and that this marriage is not a military 
invention to gain U.S. aid. As a result of these operations, the F ARC has pushed into urban 
areas. More than 500,000 peasants protested against the government's illicit crop eradication 
campaign. This civil protest, particularly in the departments of Guaviare, Putumayo and 
Caqueta, has turned violent. 
176 Tim Jonhson, "Coca-guarding Guerrillas Blow up 50-soldier Convoy," Miami Herald, 
Miami, April17, 1996. Cited by Information Services on Latin America, Vo1.51, Issue 
# 4, April 1996, p.166. 
177 
"100 Die in Rebel Attacks on Colombian Troops," The New York Times, New York, 
September 1, 1996, p.A-5. 
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Today, peasants involved in the illegal crop cultivation view the state as their own 
enemy. According to the peasants, the only solution the government is offering is the use of 
force. This is in part because the governmental plan for crop substitution PLANTE178 does 
not have the necessary resources for implementation and expansion.179 This protest, initially 
focused in the three departments, created a snowballing effect, and now civil protest has 
broken out in other minor illegal crop producing areas, the departments of Cauca, Huila, 
Narino, Arauca, and Cesar. In view of the situation it can be concluded that the levels of 
violence have increased since the country was de-certified, and the narco-guerrilla violence 
has evolved into a violent protest against the crop eradication campaign. 
Finally, the only governmental approach to this dangerous and unstable situation is the 
use of military forces and the police. This use of force is oriented toward suppressing fires 
all over the country and toward pleasing the United States to gain re-certification. For this 
reason, it is not difficult to predict that the response to this official use of force is an increase 
in the levels of violence and protest, an increase in human right violations, and the loss of 
public order. The social problems involved in narco-trafficking in Colombia are so great that 
the government cannot use force as the only response to this complicated problem. For this 
reason violence from guerrilla groups and peasants who are been pressure to stop growing 
coca will most likely increase in scope and intensity. 
2. Explaining Variable (2): Level of Socioeconomic Development 
Another major factor that has changed after the de-certification is the level of 
socioeconomic development (2). According to Diamond, Linz and Lipset: 
178 Spanish acronym for the alternative development plan, for illegal crops eradication 
(Plan de Desarrollo Alternative). 
179 According to Enrique Santos Calderon from El Tiempo, one year after it was launched 
by the Sam per's administration. The plan PLANTE, has not produced adequate results. 
He also said that this plan cannot be implemented in regions like the Department of 
Guaviare, the most important drug-producing region. The PLANTE money by law can 
only be given to those peasants that produce illegal crops just for their personal 
subsistence, and not in a region where there is large commercial cultivation. 
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... the weight of the evidence confirms a strong positive relationship between 
democracy and socioeconomic development and that this relationship is causal 
in at least one direction: Higher levels of development generate a significantly 
higher probability of democracy and of stable democracy. 180 
This is not the case in Colombia. 
It is impossible to ignore the impact that U.S. policy has on Colombia and the Colombian 
socioeconomic problems. It can be argued that the differences in policies between the Bush 
and Clinton administrations has exacerbated the problems. The Bush policies can be 
described as the actions before the de-certification and the Clinton's policies as the post de-
certification actions. On one side, during the Bush administration the drug war approach had 
emphasis on multilateral policies like the Andean initiative. According to President Bush: 
Our common partnership must confront a common enemy: international drug 
traffickers. Drugs threaten citizens and civil society throughout our hemisphere. 
Joining forces in the war on drugs is crucial. There is nothing to be gained by 
trying to lay blame and make recriminations. Drug abuse is a problem of both 
supply and demand, and attacking both is the only way we can face and defeat the 
drug menace. 181 
Furthermore, President Bush's policies after the Declaration of Cartagena in February 
1990 and the San Antonio Summit February of 1992 were oriented in three important areas: 
• First, economic assistance with the approval of the Andean Trade Preference Act 
(ATP A) which eliminated tariffs for Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian and 
Ecuadoran products for ten years. 
• Second, diplomatic cooperation through concerted action in international forums 
and to common efforts to educate the international community regarding the 
urgency of confronting the challenge posed by the narcotics trade. 
180 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, pp. 21-22. 
181 Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas, Security, Democracy, and 
Development in US-Latin American Relations, Miami, North-South Center, 
University of Miami, 1994, p.16. 
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• Finally, the "Andeanization" of the drug war and the growing militarization of the 
antinarcotics struggle. 182 
From this it can be concluded that even though there were tensions and disagreements 
during this period, the Bush administration had a more cooperative approach towards 
Colombia in the drug war. 
In contrast, the Clinton administration made an important str~tegic shift. 183 The 
administration redefined U.S. security interest in the Western Hemisphere. U.S. involvement 
in hemispheric security matters is now seen as instrumental to the maintenance of a leading 
role in global geopolitics. 184 Other manifestations of this new approach are: 
• First, the nomination of Lee P. Brown and then General Barry R. McCaffrey as 
Drug Czar. 
• Second, the creation of the Department of State's Bureau ofTerrorism, Narcotics, 
and Organized Crime, which narrowly focused on a few countries including 
Colombia. 
• Third, the distribution of 64 percent the anti-narcotics budget to suppression of the 
supply, while only 36 percent is aimed at controlling demand. 185 
• Finally, since the Colombian narco-scandal started, the Clinton administration 
has implemented a hard line policy towards Colombia, sometimes arguing that 
this "8,000 process" was an internal matter of Colombia and at other times been 
very involved in this internal process through different U.S. representatives such 
as Robert Gelbard or Milles Frechete. 
As a result of these U.S. policies, Colombia's socioeconomic problems are greater today 
than before the de-certification. The violent protest of over one half million peasants against 
182 Ibid, pp.l15-129. 
183 The Clinton administration introduced radical changes in previous policies against 
drug trafficking. According to a 1993 National Security Council report, the policies 
followed by the Reagan and Bush administrations did not have meaningful effects on 
drug cultivation and exports from Latin America. Cited in Schoultz, Smith, and Varas, 
p.21. 
184 Ibid, p.17. 
185 Ibid., pp.127-128. 
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the government eradication campaign is a signal that the Colombian state needs a strategy 
where not only forceful measures are taken but also, social and economic measures. 
Furthermore, if the United States implements economic sanctions and the economic 
preferences are cut, more than a million people involved in legal crop production such as 
flowers, bananas, etc, will be out of jobs. This will increase the socioeconomic problems and 
may push the country towards collapse. 
3. Explaining Variable (3): Legitimacy of Institutions of Polyarchy 
According to Diamond, Linz and Lipset: 
So intimately is legitimacy tied to democratic stability that it is difficult to know 
where definitions end and theorizing begins. 186 
They also suggest that: 
... democratic legitimacy is also shaped by the performance of the democratic 
regime, both economically and politically (through the "maintenance of civil 
order, personal security, adjudication and arbitration of conflicts, and a minimum 
of predictability in the making and implementation of decisions"). 187 
With this definition in mind, an approach to the impact of the de-certification upon 
Colombia's legitimacy can be made. It is important to remember that the United States is 
the leading nation of the world, so this is not a case of Colombia being de-certified by one 
of its neighbors. The U.S. action tarnishes seriously the image of Colombia worldwide. De-
certification has an enormous impact upon the country's legitimacy within the international 
community. The same lack of legitimacy that is preventing today's foreign investments also 
leads to actions like the negative reception that the President of Venezuela offered to 
President Samper on his return from France in Caracas in mid-1996. 
186 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, p. 9. 
187 Ibid., p.l 0. 
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Today, Colombia cannot make use of sentimental discourse by maintaining that 
Colombians have paid a high price in this war, that thousands of people have died because 
of the war, and that Colombians are the victims of narco-trafficking. Furthermore, 
Colombians cannot be sufficiently proud that the Medellin and Cali Cartels leaders are in jail, 
and that Colombia has destroyed hundreds of cocaine labs, seized tons of cocaine and 
eradicated thousands of acres of illicit crops. Colombians cannot use th€se arguments when 
the President and members of Congress were elected with the cartel's money; when the 
Attorney General of the country and members of Congress are in jail or being investigated 
on these charges; or when the drug dealers receive short sentences for their crimes against 
humanity. The martyr's discourse has lost impact because of the dual standard of the 
country. 
It can be argued that before the narco-scandal there was a different perception of the 
government's legitimacy. Although there were some allegations about the infiltration of 
illegal money into the President's campaign, this was considered by most of the population 
as a fabrication of the Conservative Party and its candidate Andres Pastrana who was 
considered as a bad looser. Because all of this was perceived as unsubstantiated, the 
government legitimacy was not affected. The President was able to assume his mandate and 
at the time, the prospects seemed good. However, the other side of the coin was different, 
and the course of the events changed. Losers become winners and winners may be 
prosecuted. 
At the time the narco-scandal became public the people did not know what was really 
happening, or could not imagine that this problem would threaten their own future. This 
internal situation, now exacerbated with the impact of the U.S. de-certification, has become 
the greatest reason for the Samper government's lack of legitimacy. The monster of 
corruption was hidden within Colombian society and has become so big that it is the greatest 
threat to the country's stability. Today, even though Samper was declared innocent, the 
people of Colombia have a government that is without legitimacy, isolated, and losing more 
public support every day. The worst effect of all is a President that divides rather than unites 
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Colombian society. This, at the very moment that the society is confronting the worst crisis 
in its democratic history. 
We can use the Diamond, Linz and Lip set approach to understand the impact of this 
variable on the institutions of democracy: 
... regimes that lack deep legitimacy depend more precariously on current 
performance and are vulnerable to collapse in periods of economic and social 
distress. 188 
This is the danger that Colombia's democracy is facing today: a threat to its own survival, 
and a situation that will continue to escalate if economic sanctions are implemented by the 
United States. In March 1997, a new process of certification will start. It is important to 
know that none of the de-certified countries have been re-certified by the United States in the 
past. For this reason, the likelihood that Colombia will be de-certified again, and that this 
time President Clinton's discretional sanctions will be implemented are more real than ever. 
This will constitute, in the author's opinion, the final exam for Samper's legitimacy, a test 
that could change the course of Colombian history. 
4. Explaining Variable (4): Effectiveness of Polyarchy in Solving Major 
Problems 
In the author's opinion, the opinion that Colombians have about democracy is 
not very high. This pattern have been persistent before and after the de-certification, 
especially because for the last 38 years, this system of government has not brought a better 
standard of living for most of the population. On the contrary, Colombian democracy has not 
been able to address basic needs such the right to live, to have an education, to have access 
to health and basic services, as well as the right to express opinions. Furthermore, the price 
in lives and money that the country has had to pay to maintain this so-called democracy has 
been not only high but painful. This has happened because Colombians were not able to 
understand, as Schmitter and Karl put it that: 





... democratization will not necessarily bring in its wake economic growth, social 
peace, administrative efficiency, political harmony, free markets, or "the end of 
ideology."189 
I have argued that one of the most important political reasons why Colombia has not been 
able to consolidate its democracy, is because of a very week transition phase, represented by 
the National Front experience. The National Front proved to be a good example of 
consociationalism, but while this system was used to bring peace and stability to the country, 
it also helped to bring bureaucratization and with that corruption. This background of 
Colombian democracy proved not to be fertile ground for the democratic institutions. On the 
contrary, what resulted from this experiment were weak institutions, that were unable to 
solve the people's problems. The result of this was a disillusionment with democracy. It is 
here where anti-democratic sentiments grow. 
This author agrees with Philippe Schmitter's argument that democracy, in some form or 
another, may well be the only legitimate and stable form of government in the contemporary 
world. 190 However, after the de-certification and narco-scandal this process of 
disillusionment from democracy accelerated in Colombia. Perhaps because the people were 
used to corruption at the lowest level of government, but they never realized that this source 
existed also on the top. The impact of this situation on Colombia's democratic behavior was 
huge. This attitude was reflected by the appearance of anti-democratic solutions put forward 
by members of the civilian elites. Today, there is a sense that even though it has been 
persistent, Colombian democracy continues to be unconsolidated. Worst of all, many people 
believe that the fastest way to solve the problems that Colombian democracy faces is outside 
of the democratic institutions. 
189 Schmitter and Karl, p.51. 
190 Philippe C. Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," Journal of 
Democracy, Washington D.C., vol. 5, no. 2, April1994 p.58. 
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C. THE IMPACT OF THE U.S. DE-CERTIFICATION ON COLOMBIA'S 
DEMOCRACY 
Since the process of de-certification began in March 1996, the political impact of 
sanctions has been great. These sanctions that were focused in the 1995 performance of 
Colombia in the drug war, carry with them a very important message: President Samper must 
leave the Colombian presidency. Thus, the original goal of the de-certification process was 
not achieved, and the U.S. strategy was oriented to the political arena, rather than to improve 
the results of the drug war and to search for new strategies against the drug cartels. 
At the same time this was happening, two very important processes were on course. One 
was the 1996 U.S. presidential campaign. The second was the "8,000 process," 
internationally known as the Colombian narco-scandal, concerning the infiltration of millions 
of dollars in the 1994 presidential campaign that brought Ernesto Samper to the Narifio 
Palace. These two events marked the course of the U.S.-Colombian relations during 1996. 
The bi-lateral relations between Washington and Bogota were not under the scope of 
diplomacy, but under the turbulence of a political struggle in each nation. 
However, it is very important to explore different hypotheses to avoid viewing the 
problem just from the Colombian perspective. In this study three different hypotheses will 
be tested that will help develop conclusions later in this section. These hypotheses may give 
the diagnosis of the actual state ofthe Colombian democracy: 
1. Has the U.S. De-certification Undermined Democracy in Colombia? 
After ten months of being de-certified, the argument can be made that Colombian 
democracy today is undermined. After that period, the instability of the country has been 
augmented by the levels of violence from guerrillas, narco-traffickers and right wing death 
squads. Public disorder and disobedience have reached unprecedented levels. 
There are important and specific factors that support the argument that Colombian 
democracy was undermined: 
First, we can argue that the political punch that the de-certification carries with it was not 
accomplished. President Sam per continues in the presidency of Colombia, with even more 
public support. This is in part because ofhis populist discourse against U.S. aggression, but 
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also because his social message is in support of the poor and attacks the elites. This attitude 
had permitted the people to see Samper as the President of the poor, giving his administration 
the legitimacy he lost during the "8,000 process." 
Second, the social discourse of Samper had a major impact in the struggle between 
classes. He has contributed to widening the gap between rich and poor, between upper and 
middle classes against the lower class. This policy will have a boomerang effect because at 
the same time the government is doing this, it is supporting a part of the guerillas' discourse 
against the rich and capitalism. The impact of this type of strategy on democracy without any 
doubt can lead to a catastrophe. The people do not believe in democratic institutions and see 
violence as the only option to express discontent against the rich and in support of the 
president. 
The U.S. de-certification impacts the strategies that the Colombian government has used 
in the drug war. Because of de-certification, the Colombian government tried to demonstrate 
better results in many areas in an effort to placate the U.S. economic sanctions. One of them 
is the crop eradication campaign oriented to the eradication by air and ground operations, of 
67,000 acres of illegal crops during 1996. To accomplish this objective the government had 
to involve its Military Forces in "operation conquest."191 This operation carried out by the 
military with the cooperation of the police, had a major impact in the drug-producing regions. 
Pushed by the F ARC cartel, a major civil protest began in the Guaviare Department as a 
result of operation conquest. This protest produced a snowball effect on other regions like 
the departments of Putumayo, Caqueta, Cauca, and Huila. As a result of this conflict 72 
peasants were injured and 7 killed in the Guaviare protest, 192 6 killed and 100 injured in the 
Caqueta193 and many more in other places. 
191 
"Aqui Estamos y Aqui nos Quedamos," Semana Magazine, Via Internet, Bogota, 
August 15, 1996, pp.1-6. 
192 Edison Parra Garzon, "Por Fin, Acuerdo en Orito," El Tiempo, Via Internet, Bogota, 
August 21, 1996, p.1. 
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Third, one of the most difficult topics in this drug war is the reestablishment of the 
extradition law. The battle to implement this law has caused hundreds of deaths in the past. 
Today, extradition is not permitted by the 1991 Constitution. However, the Clinton 
administration argues that this is one of the major points that must be solved if Colombia 
wants to have a solid relationship with the United States. 194 
Today, the Colombian Congress is studying the possibility of a constitutional 
amendment, but two factors undermine the positive approach of the Congressmen to this 
problem. One, because this reform is seen as U.S. intervention, an imposition; the other, due 
to the fear of a new narco-terrorist campaign. This topic and others, like the approval of laws 
against money laundering, involvement of the military in the drug war, the use of new 
chemicals to combat coca crops, changes in the justice administration, changes of the penal 
law, etc., overwhelm the Colombian Congress' legislative agenda. The impact on democracy 
that many experts see in changing the 1991 Constitution is eminent. Especially now when 
the administration has not seen as positive the independence of the justice branch from 
government, that was very clearly specified in the 1991 Constitution. The same independent 
justice is required in fighting political corruption in saving Colombia from collapse. 
Fourth, in the last four decades after the Rojas Pinilla military regime, the word "coups 
d'etat" did not have a place in the political dictionary of Colombia. Today this word has been 
brought back from the past not by the military, but on the contrary by members of the civilian 
elites. These are the same elites that have seen their own interests threatened by the 
possibility of U.S. sanctions, the dangers of economic recession, and worst of all by the 
probability of a major general insurrection, the final step of the guerrilla war in Colombia. 
These elites will not accomplish their objective, and have not changed the Colombian 
military posture of support for democracy. However, their new political message has helped 
to augment the level of turmoil and the general sense of public disorder. 
Finally, a threat that has not been confronted, but that is at present a real danger is the 
probability of the application of the United States economic sanctions on Colombia. It is 
194 John Gutierrez, "Bases de Estados Unidos para la Recertificacion," El Tiempo, Via 
Internet, Bogota, July 14, 1996, pp.1-3. 
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possible that the U.S. will implement these sanctions March 1997, especially if it does not 
see major improvements in the drug war, as well as in the legislative and judicial arenas. 
Until now the de-certification itself has had very little impact on the economy. This impact 
was reduced, thanks to the conservative economic and fiscal policies that for years have 
permitted Colombia to develop a strong economy. However, in the opinion of two of the 
most influential sectors, the National Federation of Merchants and the National Association 
of Industrialist, today economic fear and insecurity are persistent factors. The situation is a 
clear and present danger to the economy and suggests that serious trouble may lie ahead. 
The economic impact of the de-certification will increase faster than any other factor in 
the level of instability and social protest. Until today, the Colombians have not suffered any 
major alteration of their pocketbooks and their market. Furthermore, many people have not 
felt the individual consequences ofbeing a de-certified country yet. However, if sanctions 
are implemented by the U.S. in a society as violent as Colombia, the results and impact on 
democracy could be more devastating. 
2. Has the U.S. De-certification Strengthened Democracy in Colombia? 
It is very difficult to see in just ten months the positive side of the de-certification. I will 
argue that in the short term, democracy has not been strengthened by the de-certification. 
However, this study should explore the probability that in the long term the de-certification 
will produce a positive outcome. If the end result of the de-certification is a stronger state 
and institutions, narco-trafficking destroyed or diminished, and democracy consolidated, 
Colombians will have to recognize that it was a very painful process, but that it was worth 
it. 
During this research the author has found some aspects that may help to create a positive 
final outcome. First, the involvement of the military forces throughout "Operation Conquest" 
has been very important, not just against narco-traffickers but also against guerrillas. 
According to General Harold Bedoya Pizarro, Colombian Army Chief of Staff, in just one 
month of military operations the F ARC has lost $25 million in the Guaviare Department, $7 
99 
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million in the Putumayo Department and $5 million in the Caqueta Department. 195 This 
success is due to the fact that within the Operation Conquest planning there is an interdiction 
phase, that has permitted the military forces to cut all supplies from the urban areas to the 
coca production sites. Chemicals, gasoline, cement, tools and food are now restricted, 
causing a collapse in coca production, and squeezing economically the narco-guerrillas. 
This operation is helping the government and especially the army to- find more evidence 
regarding the link between guerrillas and narco-traffickers, known in Colombia as the narco-
guerrilla theory. With this argument the Colombian guerrillas are seen as the third cocaine 
cartel, along with the Medellin and Cali Cartels. Most important of all, the civil protests led 
by the F ARC against Operation Conquest in the Departments of Guaviare, Putumayo and 
Caqueta, where more than 500,000 peasants were pushed to protest against the crop 
eradication campaign, has helped to demonstrate that the group affected most by the crops 
eradication campaign are not the Medellin, Cali or North of Valle cartels, but the FARC 
cartel.I96 
Despite the civil protest, this outcome has a positive impact on democracy because it 
helps the government to reduce the guerrillas' legitimacy. At the same time it undermines 
seriously the narco-traffickers' finances and economy, and also provides a clear argument 
for a better relationship with the United States. But most important of all, if in the near future 
the United States and the international community recognize that the Colombian guerrillas 
are not politically oriented any longer, but that their only "ideology" is the traffic of 
narcotics, this will change dramatically the environment of war and, in the author's opinion, 
this will mark the beginning of their own demise. 
Second, the de-certification has helped to demonstrate that there are democratic 
institutions that are very well respected by the United States. These include the military 
forces and national police, but especially the General Prosecutor's Office. Called the Fiscalia 
General de la Nacion, this independent institution created by the 1991 Constitution, is 
195 
"Saldo en Rojo," Semana Magazine, via Internet, Bogota, August 23, 1996, pp.1-2. 
196 Ibid. 
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directed by Alfonso Valdivieso, today the person most respected by Colombians and the 
Clinton administration. This office played a major role during the "8,000 process" and has 
investigated the involvement of drug money in the political campaign. Thanks to these . 
actions, the justice administration led by the Supreme Court and the Penal Judges has been 
able to put in jail for the first time in history a considerable number of Senators, 
Representatives, and important political figures of the country like the Attorney General of 
the nation (Procurador General de la Nacion). 
After the de-certification and because of the General Prosecutor's Office behavior during 
the "8,000 process" developments, the U.S. support for the General Prosecutor's Office has 
increased. This improved legal cooperation strengthens democracy. Most importantly, the 
Prosecutor's actions against traffickers and corruption, many times supported by U.S. 
evidence, have shown the people that even the most powerful can be under the scope of 
justice. In the past there was little possibility of some corrupt politicians or government 
officials going to jail because of corruption. Thanks to General Prosecutor Valdivieso's 
actions, justice is stronger and the Fiscalia is seen as one of the most valuable institutions of 
Colombian democracy. Furthermore, this institution is today one of the most important 
reasons why a non-democratic regime can not be seen as the real solution to the country's 
problems. 
Finally, the role played by the media in this process has been more than positive. 
Independence of journalism and free press has permitted the country to understand today's 
realities. It is true that there has been some biased members of the media, but I will argue 
that in general, their impact in this process has strengthen Colombian democracy. It is 
important to mention that President Sam per's government protected by all means the free 
press, even when most of the time their arguments were personally against him. The media 
in general have helped to bring to the people the key information that in the future will help 
the voters decide whether to vote for an honest politician or a corrupt one. In the long term 
for certain, and especially if the country finds its way out of narco-trafficking, it will be 
argued that one of the major players that helped to destroy narco-trafficking was the 
Colombian media. 
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3. Has the U.S. De-certification had No Impact at All on Colombian 
Democracy? 
It is difficult to argue that U.S. decisions or strategy has no impact at all on Colombian 
democracy. The moment this becomes possible, the United States will no longer be a 
superpower. But, there are factors that can help us to explore this hypothesis. First, the de-
certification economic sanctions have not been imposed yet. Second, th€ U.S. economic aid 
for the national police was not canceled. Third, important acts of judicial cooperation 
continue to take place between the U.S. judicial authorities and the office of the Colombian 
General Prosecutor. In October 1996, after the de-certification was in effect, the U.S. 
government, concerned about reports that leftist rebels were becoming deeply involved in 
drug trafficking, substantially increased cooperation with the Colombian military. 197 
Especially because of the impact caused by Colombian narco-guerrillas actions, where more 
than 150 soldiers were assassinated, and 50 more soldiers were kidnaped by the F ARC the 
following month when Operation Conquest was put into effect, the Clinton administration 
gave $40 million to the Colombian military forces. 
These aspects can lead one to argue that de-certification has no impact at all on U.S.-
Colombian relations and that Colombian democracy has not suffered any change as a result 
of de-certification. The most important argument of this hypotheses is that economic 
sanctions have not been implemented yet, and that U.S. counter-narcotics as well as military 
aid have continued to flow into the country. Finally, although the topic of drug control was 
debated during the 1996 presidential campaign, the case of Colombia was never discussed 
as expected by Colombians. However, one must consider this hypothesis more carefully. 
First, even though the economic sanctions have not been imposed, it is important to 
consider the economic background in evaluating how well prepared the Colombian economy 
is to confront economic threats. According to Political Risk: 
197 Thomas T. Vogel and Jonathan Friedland, "U.S. Aids Colombian Army in Drug War," 
Wall Street Journal, New York, October 16, 1996, p.16. 
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. . . given the social disorder and drug problems, the Colombian economy is 
remarkably stable and conservatively managed. Growth has been steady since the 
1950s, inflation has remained under control, debt is modest, and no firms have 
been nationalized since the 1960s. Even during the difficult 1980s, economic 
growth rates managed to keep pace with population growth. Between 1982 and 
1987, Colombia achieved the highest rate of GDP growth in Latin America, 
while enjoying one of the three lowest inflation rates. 198 
With this kind of economic background we can argue that the Colombian economy is strong 
enough and for this reason the Colombian economy will not suffer in the short term. 
Furthermore, according the Colombian Minister of Finances Jose Antonio Ocampo 
during one of his speeches in the Senate plenary sessions, the economic effects of the de-
certification have not been dramatic, neither in commercial matters nor in credit aspects. He 
argues that the credits the country has with multilateral banks such as the World Bank and 
the lnteramerican Development Bank (IDB) have continued without problems. He also stated 
that there is not a short term risk that the United States will use its veto over the credit 
operations of Colombia. He explained that the only exception by which Colombia would lose 
money was with some resources from the Multilateral Investment Fund from the IDB, in 
which the country could lose $5 million dollars a year. 199 
Second, the relations between the Clinton administration and the Colombian national 
police continue to be the same before and after the de-certification occurred last March. 
This is due to the U.S. involvement influencing the designation of General Rosso Jose 
Serrano, as a General Director of the National Police since the beginning of Samper's 
administration in August 1994. General Serrano has worked for many years with the U.S. 
agencies as a director of the anti-narcotics police, where he accomplished very important 
raids against narco-traffickers. General Serrano the United States considers the only person 
capable of restoring order and combating corruption inside the ranks of the police. Because 
198 
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ofthis we can say that the relations between the United States and the Colombian national 
police have suffered no impact. The continuity of this relation permits Colombian 
democracy to continue its fight against narco-trafficking as planned. 
Third, the relations between the U.S. judicial authorities and the office of the Colombian 
General Prosecutor have not been affected by the de-certification. This very important 
relationship has not suffered any impact at all, and at the same time has permitted General 
Prosecutor Valdivieso to continue with the investigations related to drug-corruption as well 
as all the investigations related to the heads of the Cali cartel, today all in jail. Because this 
pattern has not changed, we can say that as important as de-certification is, however, in the 
short term it has not impacted the Colombian democratic consolidation process. 
Finally, the open involvement by the Colombian military forces in the drug war has 
pleased the United States. According to General Wesley Clark, the U.S. army commander 
at Southern Command in Panama: 
"In some countries, we are seeing narco-guerrilla movements that require the 
military to respond with a combat presence," he adds, "Colombia's armed forces 
are taking an active role against the traffickers."200 
This active role evidenced by the army in Operation Conquest has had a major impact on the 
narco-guerrillas business. This action at the same time has given more credibility to the 
Samper government and permitted once more to show to the international community the 
perverse marriage between guerrillas and narco-traffickers. Thanks to these actions, the 
Clinton administration moved emergency aid in support of the military, evidenced by the 
relationship between the U.S. and the Colombian military, a relationship that was very much 
affected in March 1996 by the automatic sanctions of the de-certification. This U.S. action 
reduced any doubt regarding the United States support for Colombian democracy. 
In conclusion to this chapter, the author argues that de-certification does have an impact 
on democracy in Colombia. In the short term, the U.S. de-certification undermines 
200 Vogel and Friedland, p.l6. 
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democracy in Colombia, but in the long run, it strengthens democracy.201 Table 4 summarizes 
ses of this chapter in both the short term and long this conclusion, by testing the three hypothe 
term. 
Table 4. Hypothesis Test, U.S. De-certification: Impact on 
an Democracy Colombi 
Type of Impact 
No. Hypotheses Short Term Long Term 
I Undermine Democracy (-) YES NO 
2 Strengthen Democracy (+) NO YES 
3 Has No Impact (±) NO NO 





This thesis has permitted the author to arrive at three important conclusions. First, after 
ten months of U.S. de-certification, it is difficult to predict if in the long term Colombian 
democracy will be strengthened by the de-certification. In the author's opinion, there are 
some factors that as a result of a long term de-certification impact, can contribute to this 
strengthening of democracy. They include the following: the consolidation of a very strong 
and independent judiciary, united military forces and national police fighting their part of the 
drug war, a free press, weaker narco-guerrillas, the resurgence of a new political class, and 
most important, a united and organized civil society that is tired of political corruption and 
impunity. All these points are not impossible to achieve. However, it is clear that without 
the moral, political and economic support of the United States and the international 
community, these goals cannot be achieved. 
Second, it is impossible to argue that the U.S. decision to de-certify Colombia has no 
impact on the democratic consolidation of Colombia. To ignore this impact is to ignore the 
power of the United States and the realities of the U.S.-Colombian relationship. It is 
important to remember that the United States is Colombia's most important commercial 
partner. U.S. investments in Colombia are 60 percent of all foreign investments. 
Furthermore, Colombia imports 3 7% percent of total imports from the United States, 
followed by Venezuela (10 percent), while Colombia exports 34% of total exports to the 
United States, followed by Germany, 8 %.202 These figures by themselves explain how 
important it is for Colombia to have a good relationship with the United States and the 
impact that a weakening of this relationship may produce in the Colombian economy. 
However, we cannot forget that even though the United States is commercially important 
for Colombia, narco-trafficking is the main problem that unites and separates both countries. 
As long as narco-trafficking exists, the Colombian posture against it will be influenced, 
202 
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pressured or imposed by the United States. We can conclude that today the future ofU.S.-
Colombian relations depends to a large extent on U.S. decisions, the same decisions that will 
undermine or strengthen Colombian democracy, but decisions that will always produce some 
impact. 
Third, the author's most important conclusion is that the U.S. de-certification in the short 
term has undermined the democratic consolidation of Colombia. This -permanent pressure 
of the United States on Colombia has helped to augment political fires within the country, 
but never to suppress them. These U.S. actions have not permitted Colombians to find their 
our own way out of this volatile situation. On the contrary, this permanent U.S. involvement 
has helped to make the situation worse. If guerrillas, narco-trafficking and corruption were 
the obstacles to democratic consolidation in the past, today U.S. intervention is one of the 
factors causing internal instability. Because of this, Colombian democracy is suffering its 
greatest crisis in recent history. The editorial of El Tiempo on September 12, 1996, gave a 
real indication of how difficult the situation is or may become. According to Enrique Santos 
Calderon (one ofthe most respected journalists in the country), in Colombia the situation is 
so dangerous that the people will have to choose between authoritarianism or anarchy.
203 
Unfortunately, this type of prediction about the democratic future of Colombia may be 
accurate and represents a widespread perception within the local media and educated sectors 
of Colombia. 
Finally, the process of certification continues, on a day by day, month by month, and year 
by year basis. For the last 10 years no de-certified country has been certified again. The 
impact of de-certification on Colombia has been huge and affects its institutions, economy, 
and polity. Colombians all know that this is perhaps the only opportunity that Colombia will 
have to join the community of civilized nations in a campaign to put the drug cartels out of 
business. However, Colombia cannot fight the drug war by focusing on the past. The only 
way to fight the drug war is by looking forward. Because of this, it is now time to think of 
the new de-certification process of 1997 or even 1998. The United States should give 
203 Enrique Santos Calderon, "Contraescape," El Tiempo, Via Internet, Bogota, September 
12, 1996, p.4. 
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Colombia a "vital national interest certification" in March 1997.204 This will permit the 
Colombian institutions to recover, and at the same time will have a positive impact on 
Colombian democracy. 
204 When a country whose counter-narcotics performance does not qualify for a complete 
certification, the President of the United States may give a vital national interest 
certification. This is done when the U.S. national interest outweighs the risk of less 
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